





REPORT  
OF  
THE SECRETARY OF WAR,

IN COMPLIANCE WITH

*A resolution of the Senate of the 21st ultimo, calling for copies of all the letters of the governor of Washington Territory, addressed to him during the present year; and copies of all the correspondence relative to the Indian disturbances in the Territories of Washington and Oregon.*

MAY 12, 1856.—Read, referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, and ordered to be printed.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, May 9, 1856.

SIR: In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 21st ultimo, instructing the Secretary of War "to transmit to the Senate copies of all letters addressed to him during the present year by the governor of Washington Territory, respecting the existing difficulties with the Indians in that Territory; and also all correspondence relating to Indian difficulties in the Territories of Washington and Oregon not hitherto communicated," I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of communications from the governors of Oregon and Washington Territories, and from Brevet Major General Wool, commanding the Pacific division.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JEFF'N DAVIS,  
Secretary of War.

Hon. J. D. BRIGHT,  
President of the Senate.

*The Governor of Oregon to the President of the United States.*

TERRITORY OF OREGON,  
Portland, February 5, 1856.

SIR: Herewith I have the honor to transmit a certified copy of a memorial adopted by the legislative assembly of this Territory at the late regular session of that body.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. L. CURRY,  
Governor of Oregon.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

*To his Excellency the President of the United States.*

Your memorialists, the legislative assembly of this Territory, respectfully represent that early in October last the people of Oregon and Washington Territories were startled by a general outbreak among nearly all the Indian tribes in the western and middle portions of those Territories. These hostilities, unprovoked on the part of the whites, were characterized by the usual modes of Indian warfare, and indiscriminate slaughter of all our citizens who fell into their hands, without regard to age, sex, or condition, and by the pillaging and burning of dwellings, and the destruction of property.

The people in the most defenceless parts of the country, alarmed by the dangers to which they were exposed, called upon the governor of this Territory for that protection which they had a right to ask.

We are happy to say that this cry for relief was not unheeded by the governor, and that our citizens, with a promptness and a zeal which a sense of danger alone could call forth, volunteered to go out in defence of their country, leaving their homes and the various avocations in which they were engaged. They have nobly discharged their duties, under many adverse and trying circumstances, and are still in the heart of the enemy's country, combating the Indians, or holding possession of the country which they have conquered.

In this distressing state of affairs, and while the Oregon volunteers were surrounded by hostile Indians, it was with no little satisfaction that your memorialists, as well as the people of Oregon, hailed the arrival in this Territory of Major General John E. Wool, of the United States army. His past services had led us to hope that he would at once have sent the forces under his command to the assistance and relief of our volunteers, who were desirous of returning to their homes. It is with regret we confess that, in this respect, our hopes have been disappointed. It is with regret that we are compelled to say that General Wool has hitherto remained inactive, and has refused to send the United States troops to the relief of the volunteers, or to supply them with arms and ammunition in their time of need; that he has gone into winter quarters and left our settlements exposed to the ravages of our enemies; that he has removed the greater portion of his troops from the Indian Territory to Vancouver, a military point remote from the scenes of war, and that too, while our volunteers were threatened by an overwhelming force of Indians; that he refused to go to the relief of a number of our citizens who had settled in the Walla-Walla valley, and who had fled from their homes for safety, and that he refused to send any of the forces under his command to protect the people of southern Oregon, whose lives and property were almost daily being destroyed or endangered by the Indians.

Your memorialists would have borne all these grievances in silence, and left these public acts and omissions of General Wool to the just judgment of the people of Oregon and Washington Territories, and to the approval or disapproval of the proper officers of the United States government; but so it is, that General Wool, not content with the inactive and inefficient course which he has hitherto thought proper to

pursue in this war, has departed from his inactive policy only to censure the governor and people of this Territory for their commendable zeal in defending their country, and to thwart all their efforts to procure supplies and the means of subsistence for the Oregon volunteers now in the field. Instead of offering aid and encouragement to our people, he has shown a disgraceful activity in his endeavors to persuade our merchants and those of California not to furnish ammunition and supplies for our volunteers in this trying time of their need. Instead of attending to the duties of his high office, he has become an intermeddler between the people of Oregon and the government of the United States, and publicly declared that his influence will be exerted to prevent the payment, by the United States, of the just claims incurred in prosecution of this war.

Therefore, inasmuch as your memorialists, as well as the people of Oregon, have lost all confidence in the willingness of General Wool to assist and defend them in their present Indian difficulties, they most respectfully ask that he may be recalled from the command of the military department of the Pacific, and your memorialists will ever pray.

Passed the Council, January 30, 1856.

Passed the House, January 30, 1856.

DELAZON SMITH,  
*Speaker of House of Representatives.*  
A. T. DENNISON,  
*President of the Council.*

TERRITORY OF OREGON, ss:

I, B. F. Harding, secretary of the Territory of Oregon, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and perfect copy of the original, now on file in my office.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto signed my name and affixed [L. s.] the seal of the Territory this 31st day of January, A. D. 1856.

B. F. HARDING,  
*Secretary of the Territory of Oregon.*

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*The Governor of Washington to the Secretary of War.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, OLYMPIA, WASHINGTON TERRITORY,  
February 19, 1856.

SIR: Having been constantly and closely occupied since my return from the Blackfeet council, I avail myself of this my first opportunity to inform the department fully of the condition of the Territory in the existing Indian war. And in order to arrive at a full understanding of the state of affairs, it is deemed necessary to state the facts connected with my return from the Missouri, where a treaty of peace and friendship had been concluded with the Blackfeet and other tribes of Indians.



On the 29th day of October, when two days march from Fort Benton on my return to this place, W. H. Pearson reached my camp with an express from Acting Governor Mason, bringing the startling intelligence that the Yakima Indians, with whom I had concluded a treaty in June last, had murdered a number of whites in their country, their agent, A. J. Bolan, and had finally broken out into open war; had defeated a detachment of United States troops, under Major Haller, and had declared their determination to exterminate all the whites in the country.

It was supposed that the Cayuses, Walla-Wallas, and Umatillas, would join, and that the Spokanes and Cœur d'Alènes were disposed to hostilities.

At this time my party of twenty-five men were in this condition: Our animals were poor and jaded from the constant express service in which they had been employed in the operations preliminary to the Blackfeet council, for our expresses had ranged from the Saskatchewan on the north to the Yellow Stone on the south. They possessed but few arms and little ammunition, as we had in coming up found no use for them, passing through the territory of friendly Indians.

Under these circumstances I halted the train, dispatched my secretary, Mr. Doty, to Forts Benton and Campbell to procure arms, ammunition, and fresh animals; and, on October 31, I pushed forward to the Bitter Root valley, to make arrangements for fresh animals and supplies, instructing Mr. Doty to come on as rapidly as the condition of the train would permit.

I reached the valley November 4, making the distance of 230 miles in four and a half days.

The train left the Missouri November 4, and reached Hell Gate, in the Bitter Root valley, where I had established my camp, in eight days, a distance of 200 miles.

I had overtaken, before reaching the valley, the delegation of Nez Percés chiefs, who had attended the Blackfeet council. A conference was held with them at Hell Gate.

They had already heard, through Indian rumors, of the war below. I stated to them fully the state of affairs, and requested that certain of their number would accompany me, it being my determination to push forward by way of the Cœur d'Alènes pass, although it was declared to be impracticable on account of snow.

The result of our conference was most satisfactory. The whole party, numbering fourteen men, among whom were Spotted Eagle, Looking Glass, and Three Feathers, principal chiefs among the Nez Percés, expressed their determination to accompany us, and share any dangers to be encountered.

They expressed a desire that, after crossing the mountains, I should go to their country, whence a large force of their young men would accompany me to the Dalles, and protect us with their lives against any enemy.

Having replenished my train with all the animals to be had, on November 14th we pushed forward, crossed the Bitter Root mountains the 20th, in snow two and a half to three feet deep, and reached the Cœur d'Alène Mission the 25th, taking the Cœur d'Alènes entirely by

surprise. They had not thought it possible we would cross the mountains so late in the season. With the Cœur d'Alènes I had a council, and found them much excited; on a balance for peace or for war, and a chance word might turn them either way.

Rumors of all kinds met us here; that the troops had fought a battle with the Yakimas, and had driven them across the Columbia towards the Spokane, and that the Walla-Wallas, Cayuses, and Umatillas, were in arms, and that they had been joined by a portion of the Nez Percés.

The accounts were of so contradictory a nature that nothing certain could be ascertained from them, excepting the evident fact that several of the tribes below were in arms, blocking up our road, and had threatened to cut off my party in any event. However, I determined to push forward, having first dispatched Mr. Craig, my Nez Percés interpreter, with all but four of the Nez Percés, who remained to accompany me, to the Nez Percés country, with instructions to collect the Nez Percés, tell them I was coming, and wished a strong party to accompany me to the Dalles; and having done this, to dispatch an express to me, at the Spokane, on the 27th November; accompanied by the four Nez Percés, we made a forced march to the Spokane, reaching it the next day.

The Spokanes were even more surprised than the Cœur d'Alènes at seeing us. Three hours before my arrival, they heard I was going to the settlements by way of New York. I immediately called a council, sent to Fort Colville for Mr. McDonald, in charge of that post of the Hudson's Bay Company, and also for the Jesuit Fathers at that point.

They arrived. A council was held, at which the whole Spokane nation was represented. The Cœur d'Alènes and Colvilles also were present.

The Spokanes and Colvilles evinced extreme hostility of feeling, spoke of the war below, wanted it stopped; said the whites were wrong. The belief was current that Pee-u-pee-mox-mox would cut off my party, as he had repeatedly threatened. They had not joined in the war, but yet would make no promises to remain neutral. If the Indians now at war were driven into their country, they would not answer for the consequences; probably many of the Spokanes would join them.

After a stormy council of several days, the Spokanes, Cœur d'Alènes, and Colvilles were entirely conciliated, and promised that they would reject all the overtures of the hostile Indians, and continue the firm friends of the whites.

Having added to my party twenty men on their way from Colville to the Dalles, who had delayed some weeks at this point through fear of the hostile Indians below, I organized my party as volunteers of the Territory, and mustered them into the service.

I then made a forced march to the Nez Percés country, striking the Clear Water at Lapevai. Here we found assembled the whole Nez Percés nation, excepting those in the buffalo country.

Mr. Craig had received letters which informed me that the whole Walla-Walla valley was blocked up with hostile Indians, and the Nez Percés said it was impossible to go through.

I called a council, and proposed to them that 150 of their young men should accompany me to the Dalles.

Without hesitation they agreed to go. Whilst in council, making the arrangements for our movement, news came that a force of gallant Oregon volunteers, four hundred strong, had met the Indians in the Walla-Walla valley, and after four days hard fighting, having a number of officers and men killed and wounded, had completely routed the enemy, driving them across Snake river, and towards the Nez Percés country.

The next day I pushed forward, accompanied by 69 Nez Percés well armed, and reached Walla-Walla without encountering any hostile Indians. They had all been driven across Snake river below us, by the Oregon troops.

It is now proper to inquire what would have been the condition of my party had not the Oregon troops pushed vigorously into the field, and gallantly defeated the enemy.

The country between the Blue mountains and the Columbia was overrun with Indians, numbering 1,000 to 1,200 warriors, including the force at Priest's rapids, under Kam-ai-a-kun, who had sworn to cut us off—it was completely blocked up.

One effect of the campaign of the regulars and volunteers in the Yakima country, under Brigadier General Raines, was to drive Kam-ai-a-kun and his people upon our side of the Columbia river, and thus endangering our movement from the Spokane to the Nez Percés country.

Thus we had been hemmed in by a body of hostile Indians, through whom we could only have forced our way with extreme difficulty, and at great loss of life. We might all have been sacrificed in the attempt. For the opening the way to my party I am solely indebted to the Oregon volunteers.

Pee-u-pee-mox-mox, the celebrated Walla-Walla chief, entertains an extreme hostility toward myself and party, owing to imaginary wrongs he supposed had been inflicted upon him in the treaty concluded with the Cayuses and Walla-Wallas last June, and had been known to threaten repeatedly that I should never reach the Dalles. He was the first to commence hostilities, by plundering Fort Walla-Walla, and destroying a large amount of property belonging to the United States Indian Department.

This chief was taken prisoner by the Oregon volunteers, while endeavoring to lead them into an ambush. During the heat of the first day's battle, he and four other prisoners attempted to escape by ferociously attacking the guard, and were at once shot down.

At Walla-Walla I found some twenty-five settlers, the remainder having fled to the Dalles for protection. With these were 100 friendly Indians.

Special Indian agent, B. F. Shaw, colonel in the Washington Territory militia, was on the ground, and I at once organized the district, placed him in command, and directed him, if necessary, to fortify, but at all events to maintain his ground, should the Oregon troops be disbanded before another force could take the field.

The Nez Percés auxiliaries were disbanded and returned home.



Thus we had reached a place of safety, unaided, excepting by the fortunate movements of the Oregon troops. Not a single man had been pushed forward to meet us, although it was well known we should cross the mountains about a certain time, and arrive at Walla-Walla about the time we did.

Why was this? Arrangements had been made with Major Raines, by acting Governor Mason, to push forward a force under Colonel Shaw, to meet me at the Spokane about the time of my arrival there. A company had been enlisted, organized, and marched to Fort Vancouver, to obtain equipments, rations and transportation, which Major Raines had promised both Governor Mason and Col. Shaw should be promptly furnished them. Some little delay ensued, and in the meantime Major General Wool arrived, who immediately declined equipping the company, as promised by Major Raines, and stated that he could not in any manner recognize volunteers, or furnish them equipments or transportation, and declining to supply their place with regular troops, when at Vancouver alone were some 350 men.

When remonstrated with by Captain William M'Kay, in command of the company raised to push forward to my assistance, when informed of the object for which this company was enlisted, and that if it was not pushed forward at once, or if some other force were not sent, Governor Stevens and his party would be in the most imminent danger, the general replied that in his opinion the danger was greatly exaggerated; that probably Governor Stevens would be able to protect himself, but that if he could not, then Governor Stevens could obtain an escort from General Harney.

What a reply was this? A moiety of the Indians now in arms had defeated a detachment of 100 United States regulars.

Major Raines had placed on record his opinion, that an insufficient force would be defeated by these Indians, and my party was supposed to number no more than 25 men. Yet Major General Wool very coolly says, Governor Stevens can take care of himself. So, too, in the remark, that I could obtain aid from General Harney. Did General Wool know that the distance from Fort Benton to the supposed position of General Harney was greater than the distance from Fort Benton to the Dalles, and that to obtain aid from him would require not less than six months? and that an express to reach him must pass through the entire breadth of the Sioux country? Such ignorance shows great incapacity, and is inexcusable.

Mr. Secretary, Major General Wool, commanding the Pacific division, neglected and refused to send a force to the relief of myself and party, when known to be in imminent danger, and believed, by those who are best capable of judging, to be coming on to certain death; and this, when he had at his command an efficient force of regular troops.

He has refused to sanction the agreement made between Governor Mason and Major Raines for troops to be sent to my assistance, and ordered them to be disbanded. It was reserved for the Oregon volunteers to rescue us.

There has been a breach of faith somewhere. I ask for an investigation into the whole matter.

The only demonstration made by Major Raines resulted in showing

his utter incapacity to command in the field. As has been heretofore said his expedition against the Yakimas effected nothing but driving the Indians into the very country through which I must pass to reach the settlements. I have, therefore, to prefer charges against General Wool. I accuse him of utter and signal incapacity, of criminal neglect of my safety. I ask for an investigation into his conduct and for his removal from command.

After making my arrangements in the Walla-Walla valley, I pushed to Vancouver, coming down the trail, the river being still closed, conferred with Major Raines, and then hastened to Olympia as rapidly as possible, reaching my home on the 19th January. The legislature was still in session. The greatest alarm prevailed throughout the sound. The people were living in block houses. The enemy had gained the advantage, and our regulars and volunteers had retired before them. Reinforcements were coming from the other side of the mountains to the hostile Indians. In obedience to my own convictions of duty, and in response to the sentiments of this entire community, I issued my proclamation calling for six companies of volunteers for the defence of the sound, appointed recruiting officers for the raising of three companies on the Columbia river, to operate east of the Cascades, and after remaining in my office but two days, went down the Sound to visit the friendly Indians, confer with the inhabitants, and make the necessary arrangements for the troops to take the field.

Since my arrival on the Sound, Seattle has been attacked and everything outside of its line of defences burned, except a small place named Alki, on the same bay with Seattle. The whole county of King has been devastated. Rumors of all our places being attacked have reached us daily. The northern Indians have commenced making depredations. They are now meditating to send sixteen war canoes against us. These canoes carry seventy-five men each, and can be urged with great velocity through stormy seas. To meet which danger I have requested Captain Gansevoort, now commanding the naval forces in the Sound, to keep the steamer Active cruising between Fort Townsend, Bellingham bay, and Seattle, and I have advised Governor Douglas, of Vancouver's island, of the fact, and requested him to keep one of the Hudson's bay steamers cruising in the waters of his jurisdiction, and to keep me advised of the movements of the Indians alleged to be hostile.

I have also raised a force of friendly Indians to operate against the hostiles from the line of the Snow-hou-mish. They are already in the field, are supported by all the available strength of the northern battalion of the Washington Territory volunteers, and have struck two decisive blows. The central battalion have moved from this quarter, and are now establishing a depot at Montgomery's. They will on Friday or Saturday move on the Puyallup, and will also be reinforced by friendly Indians.

The most cordial relations exist between myself and Lieutenant Colonel Casey, commanding the Puget Sound district, who appreciates fully the imminence of our danger, and who urges me to push into the field all the volunteers in my power. We shall act in concert throughout.

Since my arrival at the Sound I have revisited the Columbia river, and conferred with Colonel Wright, 9th infantry, in command of the Columbia river district. By letter I have urged both Colonel Wright and Major Rains, previously in command of the district, to dispatch troops to the interior. They are not permitted to do so by the stringent orders of General Wool, and, knowing the necessity of prompt action, I have had no alternative but to call out volunteers.

In Colonel Wright I have entire confidence, and if he was allowed to act according to his own judgment there would be nothing to apprehend. But it seems to be the determination of General Wool to play the part of the dog in the manger, neither to act himself nor to let others act.

As commander-in-chief of the militia of Washington, and in view of my oath of office, I have taken the responsibility to act. Every energy will be devoted to the work. The Indians now hostile on this side of the mountains will soon, I trust, be struck, and peace be restored to our distracted Sound.

For my full views in reference to operations east of the Cascades, I enclose a copy of a memoir which I have addressed to General Wool, with an extract of a letter to Colonel Wright, modifying my views in certain particulars, in consequence of the lateness of the season and the condition of affairs on the Sound.

I also send a copy of my message to the legislature, and of the message of Governor Mason, when that legislature first assembled.

Governor Mason will soon be in Washington, from whom you will be able to gain every information which this office could furnish.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,

*Governor and Super't Indian Affairs, W. T.*

HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS,

*Secretary of War.*

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HEADQUARTERS, CAMP WASHINGTON TERRITORY VOLUNTEERS,  
*Walla-Walla Valley, W. T., December 23, 1835.*

SIR: I reached this point, some thirty miles to the eastward of Fort Walla-Walla, on the Columbia, on the 20th instant. We have had extraordinary success in our long march from the waters of the Missouri, and I trust that the conferences with the Indian tribes on my way will have some effect in preventing the tribes now peaceable from becoming hostile.

A very important result has been gained by the operations of the volunteers of Oregon in this valley. The Cayuses, Walla-Wallas, Umatillas, the Tye of Deshute, and a portion of the Palouse Indians, mustering five to six hundred warriors, have been defeated and driven across the Snake river. They are now scattered along the north bank of the Snake from its mouth to the Nez Percés country, and the bulk of them are believed to be in camp in the first wood on the Palouse

river. From the best information I can gain, I am of opinion that not more than five to six hundred Indians participated in the fight; these Indians are in constant communication with the Yakimas, under Kam-i-a-han, and we have reports that he is meditating an attack with their combined forces upon the troops in this valley. These reports I do not credit; I am of opinion that the Indians desire the war to be put off till spring, in the hope that their numbers may be augmented by the Spokanes, Omahanes, Colvilles, Cœur d'Alènes, and the tribes north of the line, and in case of defeat, by having the means of retreat to the north and across the mountains eastward to the buffalo country.

The Cœur d'Alènes, Spokanes, Colvilles and Omahanes number about 2,100 souls, and some 400 to 500 warriors, only a portion armed with guns. The former tribes, numbering about 1,700, I called into council on the Spokane, early this month, and have received from them the most unqualified assurances that they would reject all the overtures of the hostile tribes, and maintain relations of friendship with the government; but they have been very much shaken by the efforts made to invoke them in the war, and if operations are suspended till spring there would be great danger that they would then be met in arms.

The Nez Percés are staunch and entirely reliable. Some seventy of these warriors, well armed, accompanied me from their own country and are now in my camp. I crossed the mountains with twenty-five men, and by accessions from the mines, and citizens who had fled for protection to the Nez Percés country, and from other sources, we have a force of volunteers, organized in two companies and numbering in all fifty-two men. The volunteers of Oregon in this valley number about four hundred men.

I am of opinion that all the tribes, from the Dalles to the Nez Percés country and from the Blue mountains to the Spokane river, now in arms against the government, have not over twelve hundred adult males, and that they cannot bring into the field more than one thousand effective men. My sources of information are good, and I write with much confidence. The hostile tribes, throwing out bands known to be friendly and in charge of local agents, do not number quite five thousand souls.

On reaching this point, I exceedingly regretted to learn that the Yakima country had been abandoned. In my opinion, it could have been held by two hundred men, and have been supplied by Walla-Walla. There is a good road from Walla-Walla to the Yakima mission; the distance is about ninety miles. Little or no snow lays on the ground for more than two thirds the distance, and at the mission the snow is seldom more than six inches deep.

This whole valley is remarkably favorable for winter operations. Grass and wood are abundant, and there are numerous streams of excellent water. The snow lays on the ground but a short time, and then but a few inches deep, and scarcely interfering with the grazing of animals.

North of the Snake, the Palouse, and its tributaries, the grass is

also good, and there is a large quantity of pine. The pine on the Palouse is found eighteen miles from its mouth.

From the Palouse to the Columbia, north of the Snake, the country is not so favorable; there is not much wood, nor much running water, and the grass is of inferior quality. There is nothing but drift wood on the Snake, enough, however, for camping purposes. There is nothing but drift wood on the Columbia till you reach the mouth of the Wee-nat-chap-pam, where the pine commences.

From the mouth of the Palouse, and from the several crossings above, there is no difficulty in moving to the Spokane country all through the winter. The grass is uniformly good, there is abundant pine in the Spokane, and there will be wood for fuel at all the intermediate camps on all the routes.

The information here given so minutely is wholly the result of personal examination, and I can vouch for the accuracy of it all.

I send you a map of the country from the Cascades to the Bitter Root mountains, showing the Indian tribes, their numbers, their warriors, the points those hostile are now believed to occupy, the several routes for the movement of troops, points for depot camps, where there is abundant grass and abundant pine within reach, the several crossings of Snake river, and the *winter snow line*, over which the Indians cannot cross when pursued by troops, and the line within which troops can operate all through the winter.

I will respectfully recommend that you urge forward your preparations with all possible dispatch, get all your disposable force in this valley in all of January, establish a large depot camp here, occupy Fort Walla-Walla, and be ready early in February to take the field.

February is generally a mild and open month. February and March are the favorable months for operating. All the Indians are destitute of food, the rivers are easy to cross, the mountain passes are closed. In April the Indians can retreat in the Pearl d'Oreille route eastward of the mountains. In May the Coeur d'Alènes route is also open. The streams are swollen, and the salmon begin to run. In June roots are abundant, and the streams most difficult to cross. If operations be vigorously prosecuted in February and March, there is little probability of any of the tribes now peaceable taking part in the war. This is the conclusion to which I was brought by the recent council held by me with the Indian tribes on the Spokane.

I do not entertain the idea that all operations can be brought to a close in these two months. The strength of the combination can, however, be broken, but the country should be held all through the ensuing year.

As to transportation, I would urge that a line of barges be established on the Columbia; that supplies be hauled in wagons from the Dalles to the mouth of the De Chutes, and thence by water to Fort Walla-Walla, then to the Yakima country, (the Mission;) to the crossing at the mouth of the Palouse, and to any point which may be selected in this valley as a depot camp, supplies can be hauled in wagons. The roads are all good.

When operations are extended to north of the Snake, and the north



bank is held, a new depot camp can be established, and the water line extended.

The Hudson Bay barge should be adopted, only be increased in size. The barge most commonly in use carries 6,000 pounds and requires seven men. But the great difficulty in the river is at the falls, at the mouth of the De Chutes river, which is avoided by hauling in wagons to above that point. A barge could be constructed which would carry 12,000 pounds, require eight men, and make two round trips a month from the De Chutes to Fort Walla-Walla. Supplies for 500 men, say four pounds per day, including clothing, ammunition, &c., and forage for 500 animals, 12 pounds a day, each animal, would require 10 of these barges, 80 men, about ten (10) three-yoke ox teams, running from the Dalles to the De Chutes. An ox team could not make more than three round trips from the Dalles to Fort Walla-Walla, in two months, and this would be more than ought reasonably to be expected. To transport the above amount of supplies and forage in wagons would require 100 ox teams and 100 men. Unless foraged on the road, oxen, after making one round trip, must have rest, and a large number of spare oxen must be at hand at both ends of the line to keep the teams constantly in motion. It will probably be very difficult to get early into the field so large a train; a pack train will be still more expensive, and it will be wanted in advance. Supplies, in my judgment, will mostly have to be transported from the depot in this valley by pack trains.

The Hudson Bay people at Fort Vancouver can put their hands on the men who understand making these barges. I estimate that five barges could be built at Portland and be in readiness for their loads at the mouth of the De Chutes in 20 days, and five more in 30 days. It is a small affair to make them.

I derive my information in regard to the barges from Mr. Sinclair, of the Hudson Bay Company, a gentleman of sound judgment and large experience, and most favorably known to all the citizens of the Columbia valley.

I believe it is practicable to run stern-wheel steamers from the mouth of the De Chutes to above Walla-Walla, and as far as the Priests' rapids; but time will be required to get a suitable one on the route, and to establish wood yards. There is nothing but drift wood on the immediate banks of the Columbia, below the mouth of the Wee-nat-chap-pan. I would respectfully urge, however, that your early attention be given to the matter.

The plan of campaign which occurs to me as feasible is as follows: Occupy the Walla-Walla valley in January; establish a large depot camp on the Touchet; hold Fort Walla-Walla; get up supplies by a line of barges on the Columbia; have an advance post on the Tucanon, and pickets at the crossings at the Palouse and opposite the bend of the Tucanon. This disposition of the troops will make you master of the Walla-Walla valley, give you the control of the country of the Snake, and enable you to get information of the enemy. In February cross the Snake, attack the enemy on the Palouse, establish a depot camp at the first wood, extend the line of barges up the Snake to the Palouse, and push forward a column to below Okinahane.

These operations will probably drive all the hostile Indians into the Yakima country, west of the Columbia river; when more down the Columbia, cross into the Yakima country and put the enemy to his last battle. He cannot cross the mountains till May, and all the troops left behind at Fort Walla-Walla and at depot camps, except indispensable guards, marched up seasonably from Fort Walla-Walla by the line of the Yakima river, would, with the movement of the column from north of the Snake, drive him into a corner, from which he could not easily escape.

There will be no difficulty whatever in making the crossing of the Snake. To the upper crossings canoes could be brought from the Nez Percés country. For the Palouse crossing, with a few tools, boats could be made in a few days, on the Touchet, and be transported thither on wheels. My India rubber boats for the Indian service were unfortunately cut to pieces by the Indians, at Fort Walla-Walla. During the winter months the rivers are low.

The question occurs, is the plan compatible with the force at your command?

In my judgment, 300 to 400 effective troops will signally defeat any force which the enemy could bring together from the tribes now hostile. In my plan of operations at Fort Walla-Walla, at the depot camp of the valley, and to hold the river crossings, 200 men would be required. If a smaller force were left, it might tempt the Yakimas, under Kam-a-a-hum, to move rapidly into his own country, if not already there, cross the Columbia below the mouth of the Snake, steal all the animals, and break up the communications. If very much reduced, he might successfully attempt an attack upon the troops. With 200 men, I do not think he would attempt anything on this side of the Columbia. The barges in brigade of five each, manned by 40 men, I do not think, with a small force on the Umatilla, would be in danger of attack. They could destroy all the canoes, and take from the enemy the means of crossing the river below Walla-Walla.

In the advance movement on the Palouse there should be five hundred men. This whole force will be disposable for the first blow on the Palouse; 200 men will hold the line of the Snake, and 300 will be left for the advance movement on the Columbia, below Okinahane.

When the enemy is driven into the Yakima country, from the depot camps north and south of the Snake, a strong column can be thrown across the Columbia at the mouth of the Snake, say 200 men, which, with 150 from this column moving towards Okinahane, will give 350 men. I would advise that 150 men of that column be left to cut off retreat in any attempt to recross the river.

In this plan of the campaign, the troops are interposed between the hostile tribes and the friendly ones, and they are brought to a final stand, where there is scarcely a possibility of escape. If the Yakima country were held simultaneously with this valley and with operations upon the Palouse, it might drive the enemy upon the Spokane, and thus cause them to embark in the war. The holding of the Yakima country would, however, effectually protect the line of the Columbia, and render it unnecessary to leave so large a force in this valley. But this plan would require more troops than the other.

By the Walla-Walla valley on this paper, I mean the whole country in the re-entering of the Snake.

With a small force on the Umatilla, and the troops required at the Dalles, 800 effective men will be required, and making allowances for the sick list and for casualties, 1,000 men should be in the field. There are here, or are on their way, 500 volunteers from Oregon; I hear that you have, or will soon have, 500 to 600 regulars.

The volunteers with me have been mustered into the service of the Territory for a specific duty, and will be discharged when I go down to the Dalles. On the Spokane, I was able to learn nothing of the plan of the campaign, and only knew that Kam-i-a-hum, with all his forces, was believed to be on the Spokane side of the Columbia, and that the Cayuses and Walla-Wallas were assembled, some 600 warriors, in the Walla-Walla valley. I expected at that time to be obliged to force my way through this body with my small force of less, at that time, than 50 men, and the Nez Percés to the Dalles. The Nez Percés chiefs, who accompanied me from the Blackfeet council, tendered to me the services of 150 fighting men of the nation, and it was not till I had been some hours with them in council, in their own country, making the necessary arrangements, that I learned of the defeat of these tribes, and that the road was opened. I took with me, however, some 70 Nez Percés, well armed, besides young men, to herd and guard our animals.

OLYMPIA, W. T., *January 29, 1856.*

The above was written to be dispatched by an express to you at Vancouver. I concluded, however, to come in person, and reached Vancouver the day of your departure from Portland to San Francisco.

I have since my return carefully examined the condition of affairs in the Sound, have visited nearly every point, and informed myself thoroughly of our necessities.

We are now feeding 4,000 Indians on the Sound alone; a band of hostiles, numbering from 200 to 400 are in the field. The whole country is opened to attack from them and the northern Indians. All our people are living in block houses. The town of Seattle was attacked on the 26th instant, and the families compelled to go on ship-board. The whole of King county has been devastated, and the inhabitants driven within the line of defences of the town of Seattle. We need at least six hundred troops to cope with the enemy, and the war will, I fear, from the nature of the country, be a protracted one.

In conclusion, it is due to frankness that I should state that I have determined to submit to the department the course taken by the military authorities in the Territory of Washington for my relief. No effort was made, although the facts were presented both to Major General Wool and Major Rains to send me assistance. The regular troops were all withdrawn into garrison, and I was left to make my way the best I could through tribes known to be hostile. It remains to be seen whether the commissioner selected by the President to make treaties with the Indians in the interior of the continent is to be ignored, and his safety left to chance.

I had no fear of my own safety, but the facts in the settlements

did not warrant such belief. I simply, with 50 odd men and 150 Nez Percés, would have been compelled to fight 600 Indians in the Walla-Walla valley had it not been for the operations of the Oregon volunteers.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,

*Governor Territory of Washington.*

Major General JOHN E. WOOL,

*Commanding Pacific Division, Vancouver, W. T.*

N. B. The map is not quite ready. I will send it to the post at Vancouver.

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*Extract of a letter from Governor Stevens to Colonel Wright, February 6, 1856.*

In view of the lateness of the season, my views, as stated in my memoir to General Wool, and a copy of which I have sent to you, are modified as follows:

1. Operate simultaneously in the Yakima country, and north of the Snake river.

2. Send at least two companies of the troops now at Vancouver to the Sound.

The volunteers on the Sound will be in the field this week, but the force will be small, and unless operations are prosecuted with great promptness and energy, we have reason to apprehend that many of the Indians now friendly will become hostile.

I will urge you to push two companies to the Sound without delay, and to push your troops against the Indians east of the Cascades.

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*Message of the governor of the Territory of Washington, delivered in joint session of the council and house of representatives of Washington Territory, Friday, December 7, 1854.*

*Fellow-citizens of the Legislative Assembly:*

In the absence of the executive, I have the honor to respond to your call. To the people of this Territory, and to me especially, that absence is, at this time, particularly to be regretted, for the present juncture of affairs requires all the experience, ability, and energy so justly conceded to the distinguished gentleman who has the honor to preside over this Territory, and whose duties in such absence by law devolves upon the Secretary of the Territory. With real sincerity I will assert that many and grave doubts have arisen in my mind as to my ability to discharge the weighty and responsible duties incident to, and arising out of, our present Indian relations; but, with a firm

reliance upon the patriotism of the people, and their hearty co-operation, I have endeavored to compensate for want of experience by an earnestness of purpose, and a zealous effort to discharge my whole duty.

It is a subject of regret that pressure of business and multiplicity of labors prevent as full and careful a review of matters as is desirable. Should, therefore, things seemingly important be omitted, or slightly alluded to, the neglect must be attributed not to intention, but rather to an attention to more pressing matters.

Since you were last assembled an important and, I regret to say, disastrous change has taken place in our social prospects. While peace and security seemed to reign about us, and every person was, as usual, pursuing his customary avocations, an Indian war breaks out in our midst, spreading alarm throughout the whole Territory. Families are murdered, property is destroyed, claims are abandoned for the fort and the block house, and the whole country, instead of portraying the usual peaceful occupations of American citizens, has the appearance of desertion, and nothing but parties of armed men are to be seen in motion. How long this state of affairs is to continue it is impossible to say; but, from the energy which our citizens have shown, and the measures which have been adopted, it is earnestly to be hoped that the end is not far off.

The extinguishment of the Indian title to lands within the Territory, had been long and loudly called for by the people. This was a matter absolutely necessary for our welfare, in order that there might be no conflicting claims between the settler and the Indian, and that the Indians might be placed in such a position that, while they were taken care of and protected, they could at the same time, as far as possible, be prevented from doing harm.

In the month of December, 1854, in pursuance of instructions from the general government, Governor Stevens entered upon this delicate and arduous task. The first treaty was made in the county of Thurston, in the vicinity of the Nisqually river, on the 26th of December; was ratified by the United States Senate before its adjournment, March 3, 1855, has been proclaimed by the President, and is now a part of the supreme law of the land. The basis of that treaty is the basis of all that have been concluded since. Great care was taken to explain the provisions and the objects of negotiation to the various tribes. Careful interpreters were secured, and every individual was allowed to speak his views. Similar treaties have been concluded with all the Indians west of the Cascade mountains, with the exception of the Chehalis, those residing in the neighborhood of Shoalwater Bay and on the Columbia, as far east as the Dalles.

In pursuance of the instructions and line of policy marked out by the Indian Department at Washington City, Governor Stevens crossed the Cascade mountains, and in conjunction with the superintendent of Indian affairs of Oregon, treaties were effected with the various bands known as the Yakima tribe, the Cayuses, the Walla-Wallas and the Nez Percés. He then proceeded to Fort Benton, on the Missouri river, where a great council had been called, to conclude and settle a definite peace between the tribes divided by the Rocky



mountains, hostilities between which had continued ever since the whites have had any knowledge of the country.

This measure was of vital importance to the Territory of Washington, as, while these hostilities continued, there could be no safe travel or communication by the great northern route connecting the waters of the Columbia and Puget Sound with the headwaters of the Mississippi. It may be well here to state, that the latest information received will justify the belief that that treaty has been concluded, and the return of Gov. Stevens is daily looked for.

In the midst of this favorable appearance of things, while the ink was scarcely dry with which treaties had been written, Indians, who had entered into these stipulations, and solemnly pledged their faith to preserve amity and peace towards all American citizens, have risen in arms, treacherously surprised, and barbarously murdered our inoffending citizens, killed an Indian agent, while in the performance of his official duties, and in defiance of all plighted faith and written obligation waged a war, accompanied with all the horrid brutalities incident to savage life.

The sphere allotted to this message will not justify a recital of the preliminary aggressions. Satisfactory evidence, however, has been afforded, indicating that both in Oregon and this Territory, for a great length of time, preparations for war had been going on on the part of the Indians. Simultaneously with the murders committed in the Yakima valley, southern Oregon became the scene of Indian warfare, and the moment troops move from Puget Sound across the mountains, an outbreak takes place on the White river prairies.

On the 23d of September, in addition to previous floating rumors, positive information was received that two of our citizens had been murdered in the Yakima valley, while travelling on the military road across the Naches pass. A requisition was immediately made upon the commanding officers of the military posts of Fort Steilacoom and Fort Vancouver for sufficient forces to proceed, by different routes, into that country, to procure, if possible, the murderers, if not to punish the tribe, and to furnish protection to such persons as might be travelling to, or returning from the Colville mines. Both of these requisitions were promptly complied with. Previous to this, Major Haller, commanding Fort Dalles, being nearer the scene of action, and having earlier information, had moved into the field, and on the 6th of October was attacked by an immensely superior force, and, after a gallant and desperate conflict of about forty-eight hours, succeeded in driving off the enemy, losing five men killed and sixteen wounded, together with a large portion of his animals and all of his provisions. This last compelled him to return to the Dalles. Upon the receipt of this information, Major Raines, commanding the Columbia river and Puget Sound district of the United States army, made a requisition upon the governor of Oregon for four companies of volunteers, and upon the governor of Washington for two. The proclamations by the respective executives, calling for these forces, were responded to with zeal and alacrity by the citizens of this and of our sister Territory. In consequence of the scarcity of arms existing in this section of country, in order to furnish the volunteer force being raised here, it

became necessary to make a requisition both upon the United States sloop-of-war "Decatur," and the revenue cutter "Jefferson Davis," for such as could be spared. Much praise is due to the commanding officers of those two vessels for the willingness and promptness with which they responded to that request, thus enabling the first company of Washington Territory volunteers to be equipped and ready for the field the moment their organization was completed.

On the 30th of October, Major Rains, having received from me the appointment of brigadier general of the volunteer forces serving in the Yakima war, moved into the field with all the disposable regular troops, and having the co-operation of nine companies of Oregon mounted volunteers, under command of Colonel Nesmith. After proceeding as far as the Yakima Mission, having several skirmishes with the enemy, capturing some of their cattle and horses, and destroying several large caches of provisions, the whole command returned to the Dalles, the unusual inclemency of the season preventing a winter campaign. In the meanwhile, the command moving from Fort Steilacoom, under command of Lieutenant Slaughter, proceeded across the mountains, through the Naches pass, to within about twenty-five miles of the Atahman Mission, where, learning of the return of Major Haller to the Dalles, they fell back, first to the summit, and then to the upper prairies on White river. Being reinforced with seventy-six regulars and company B of the Washington Territory volunteers, under command of Captain Gilmore Hays, the whole detachment, under command of Captain M. Maloney, U. S. 4th infantry, again advanced; but, after crossing the summit, were overtaken by an express, informing them that delay had taken place in the movements of the troops from the Columbia river. Captain Maloney consequently fell back to the first grazing ground on this side of the mountains—the White river prairies. During these movements, a band of rangers had been organized, under command of Captain Charles H. Eaton, whose duty it was made to guard the outskirts of the settlements, and watch the various mountain passes. Scarcely had the command commenced its operations when a detachment of eleven men, on regular scouting duty, were suddenly attacked by Indians, heretofore supposed to be friendly. Taking refuge in a log house, after gallantly sustaining a siege of some sixteen hours' duration, the Indians were repulsed. The murder of several highly esteemed citizens travelling from Captain Maloney's camp into the settlements, and the massacre on White river, followed.

The return of the command under Captain Maloney cannot but be looked upon as a most fortunate event for the settlers on Puget Sound, as it is impossible to say what might have been the result, with the settlements entirely unprotected, and many of the Indians at open war, and the rest, to say the least, wavering. The battle on White river, in which both regulars and volunteers so admirably distinguished themselves, cannot fail to impress the Indians with the superiority and power of the white man, and that, however protracted the contest may be, ruin and desolation must necessarily come upon them.

The calls upon the people of the Territory for their services in the

present war have been met by the organization of 12 companies, consisting of two companies of rangers, and ten companies of the 1st regiment of Washington Territory volunteers, amounting, in all, to upwards of seven hundred men. Of these about five hundred are mounted. In addition to these, there is a company of rangers at the Cowlitz Farms, under command of Captain Peers, not regularly mustered into service, but ready to perform such duty as may be required of them.

I deem it my duty, here, to make public acknowledgements of the services rendered by his excellency, JAMES DOUGLAS, governor of Vancouver's Island. Upon the alarm naturally attendant upon a serious Indian outbreak, almost within arm's-length of us, and owing to the scarcity of arms and ammunition, application was made to him for such an amount of these munitions of war as he could possibly furnish. That application was promptly and cordially responded to, to the extent of his power; he at the same time regretting that he had at the moment no vessel-of-war at his disposal, and that his steamers, the "Otter" and "Beaver," were both absent, but upon the arrival of either, she should be dispatched to the Sound, to render such service as might be required of her. Since then the "Otter" has visited this place.

This movement on the part of the executive of Vancouver's Island cannot fail to have its influence upon the Indians residing upon our waters, having a tendency to show to them that whatever differences may exist between the Americans and the Englishmen, in their social and political organization, as far as savages are concerned they are but one.

The Indians west of the Cascades, with the exception of those before alluded to, still continue friendly. They have been collected at various points, disarmed, and placed under the surveillance of local agents, and arrangements have been made for their support. The only fear at present entertained is that, by some act of indiscretion, they may be frightened into the hostile ranks.

The disposition which has been subsequently made of the troops in the field in this portion of the Territory has been with the design—while at the same time to keep the hostile Indians in check, adequate force should be moving on the outskirts of the settlements—in order that the farmers might be enabled to return to their claims to provide for the coming year's subsistence.

The general stagnation in trade and industrial pursuits, arising out of the present state of affairs, loudly calls for prompt and speedy action on the part of the general government. Should Congress adjourn without affording the relief so pressing needed in this emergency, it will much retard our territorial growth and advancement. I therefore earnestly recommend a memorial calling for a sufficient appropriation to remunerate the citizen soldiery for their valuable and patriotic services, and the citizens generally for the supplies they so promptly furnished, and for the property destroyed.

Beyond the limits of our Territory to the north, the coast and innumerable islands are inhabited by numerous tribes of Indians of a fierce and warlike character, bands of which are constantly in the

habit of descending into our settlements for the ostensible purpose of procuring labor. Besides the alarm occasioned to the most exposed settlers by the presence of these unwelcome visitors, complaints frequently arise from the various thefts committed by them. In case punishment is attempted to be inflicted, isolated settlers, as we already know from past experience, are liable, in revenge, to be cut off by them. In view of these facts, in order to discourage their coming within the limits of the Territory, I respectfully submit to your consideration, whether or not it would be advisable to enact a law making it penal for any person to employ for hire any of these northern bands. In connexion with this subject, considering the nature of the waters of Puget Sound, the numerous tribes residing on its borders, the liability to incursion from foreign tribes, and the utter inefficiency of sailing vessels for rapid communication, I will recommend that you memorialize the Navy Department to station within our waters an armed steam vessel.

I will here call your attention to the trade that has been too largely carried on with the Indians in guns and ammunition. Our very self-preservation demands that it should entirely cease, and that very stringent laws should be passed upon the subject.

The present existing war has suggested many deficiencies in our militia law. It provides for the election of officers, but on the subject of enrollment of men, and the rendering the militia effective, it is extremely defective. I would respectfully recommend the election of the general staff, consisting of a brigadier, adjutant, quartermaster and commissary general, by the legislative assembly, and a system of enrollment of all capable of bearing arms in the various counties, and that the formation of companies be entirely volunteer—to elect their own officers, and to be formed into battalions or regiments as circumstances may require. The scattered nature of our settlements, and the isolation of some of our counties, seems to dictate this as the most effective means for their protection, and at the same time the most expedient for combination or general action. I suggest it for your consideration.

During the past summer, rumors of discoveries of gold fields near Fort Colville induced many enterprising and energetic citizens of the Territory to visit that region. Many have returned on account of the war, and the impossibility obtaining provisions there, during the winter. Although the extent of the gold bearing district is not known, yet the fact is certain, that those who worked the bars and prospected the country near Fort Colville found gold in sufficient quantities to pay well for working. Wherever the more experienced miners dug, either upon the bars or upon the hill-sides, gold was found, and even with the rude mode of working with pans an average of \$10 per day has been made, and those who are still at the mines report profitable employment. I have no doubt that, with improved machines and better preparations for working to advantage, these gold mines will prove amply remunerative to many citizens who may go there, whenever the state of the country will permit communication between the Columbia river and Puget Sound settlements and the gold bearing region.

The prosecution of the public surveys during the past year, has developed large bodies of fertile lands, and made great addition to the topographical knowledge of the Territory, which will be useful to emigrants in search of the best lands. As to the amount of work thus far accomplished, the office of the surveyor general shows the following results: Total amount surveyed while this Territory was under the Oregon office, 1,876 miles; amount surveyed and under contract since the organization of the Washington office, 3,063 miles: proposed to be surveyed in 1856 and 1857, as per annual report of the surveyor general, 5,688 miles—all lying west of the Cascade mountains.

The general government has made liberal appropriations for public surveys in the Territory, but the surveyor general has found it impossible to obtain surveyors willing to contract for the whole amount, as the exceedingly difficult nature of the country, and the high prices of labor and provisions, have subjected to loss those who undertook the work, even at the maximum prices allowed by law. The present Indian war has stopped all field work in this important part of the development of our Territory; but it is hoped that it can be resumed in the spring, and that you, by your action, will second the urgent request of the surveyor general to the General Land Office that an increased sum per mile be allowed by the general government for further surveys.

At the last session of Congress, appropriations were made for the military roads in this Territory: One from Fort Benton, in Nebraska, to Walla-Walla; one from the Dalles to Columbia barracks; and one from Columbia barracks to Fort Steilacoom. A reconnoissance has been made of the two latter during the present fall, and it is expected work will be commenced thereon during the coming spring.

In addition to these roads, communication should be opened by land to Bellingham Bay, on the north, and through the valleys of the Chehalis and Willapah to Grey's Harbor, Shoalwater Bay, and some point near the mouth of the Columbia, on the south. These roads will be of great importance, in a domestic point of view, as opening a large section of country to settlement, and communication with other settlements; and, in military affairs, as affording means of communication with exposed points, and of rapidly marching troops into the fastnesses, and lairs of those savages who may hover upon the outskirts of the settlements. I call your attention to this as a subject of memorial.

In the "act making appropriations for the support of the army for the year ending the 30th of June, 1856, and for other purposes," it was provided, that the Secretary of War shall equalize, as far as practicable, the number of arms heretofore distributed, and now in possession of the several States, so that each State which had received less than its pro rata share shall receive a number sufficient to make an equal pro rata proportion for all the States, according to the number of their representatives and senators in Congress, respectively.

Under this provision, the amount falling due to this Territory is 2,000 muskets. An effort was made to draw them in rifles, but failed from some regulation to the contrary. In addition to this, our annual quota of arms is 137 muskets, which amount, consisting of 2,137



muskets, have been drawn in 1,980 muskets, 100 rifles and accoutrements, and 30 cavalry sabres. The whole amount—to which 208,000 caps were added—have arrived at Vancouver, in this Territory, some mistake having occurred in their shipment. Owing to the difficulty of transportation at the present season of the year, between the Columbia river and Puget Sound, efforts have been made to procure the proper portion suitable for the Puget Sound section of country, transported direct, by sea, from Vancouver to this place.

Your attention is urgently requested to the subject of the postal arrangements for the Territory. Mail routes have been established throughout the Sound, and a large appropriation has been made for carrying the mail from Olympia by sea to San Francisco.

The contracts of the former have not as yet been let, and the latter has proved inadequate for the service required, and thus far been of no avail.

In the present critical state of affairs our exposed position demands from the general government a more rapid communication with San Francisco and New York.

By an act of the last legislative assembly, the public buildings of the Territory were located, and by subsequent resolution the governor was requested to draw the amount appropriated by Congress to be used in the erection of the capitol.

During the vacation of the legislature, and as soon as a site for the capitol could be cleared, the plan of construction was adopted, and a contract entered into for its erection. The building was fast reaching its completion when the Indian war broke out, taking from said building the artisans engaged, and preventing the possibility of securing others. Under these circumstances, a suspension of the work was ordered, and I have been compelled to employ, temporarily, the hall used by the legislative assembly at its last session. The architect and contractor of the capitol assures me, however, that the work will be finished shortly.

In reference to our boundary question, and the extinguishment of the rights of the Hudson's Bay and Puget Sound Agricultural Companies, I refer you to the last message of the executive.

In conclusion I will state, that as far as my limited judgment extends every effort has been made on my part for the protection of the Territory. An Indian war, existing all around us, demands from every citizen a unanimity of opinion and a concert of action.

From the uniform courtesy which has ever been extended to me by the citizens of this Territory, as long as the duties of acting executive devolve upon me, I shall rely upon your patriotism and earnest cooperation, and, having in view but one object—that of duty—shall leave it to you how far that object has been accomplished.

C. H. MASON.

*Special Message of the Governor, delivered in joint session of the council and House of Representatives of Washington Territory, Monday, January 21, 1856.*

*Fellow-citizens of the legislative assembly of the Territory of Washington:*

I have taken the liberty of departing from the usual custom of delivering a written message. This arises from the exigencies of the case. It did not seem necessary to follow the etiquette usual in such cases, if by doing so time should be lost or public business deferred.

We are, fellow citizens, and have been for the past three months, engaged in an Indian war. Our settlers, from the Cowlitz river to the Sound, have been obliged to abandon their claims, to live in forts. It is true that almost all the Indians are friendly; that the number of Indians hostile does not exceed the number of one hundred and fifty or two hundred; but from the peculiarity of the country, if this force is not soon crushed, it will prove a source of serious annoyance upon this side of the Cascade mountains and the other. Several tribes have violated their plighted faith and broken out in open hostilities.

We are now in the midst of a war. What has brought it about, and what is the remedy? Gentlemen of the legislative assembly, it is due to you that I should enter dispassionately and fully into the policy which has marked the government in the making of treaties with the Indians of this Territory. It is important that the honor and dignity of that government should be sustained. That its course should be characterized by humanity and justice. Those who have done their duty and maintained the dignity and honor of the country should not be struck down. Let the blow be struck in the right quarter. If dignity and honor have been maintained, then has no citizen anything to blush for, and it is a bright page in the history of the country and dear to every citizen.

When this Territory was organized there was a population of about four thousand souls, widely scattered. No treaties had been made with the Indians occupying the lands of this Territory, nor was there, practically, an intercourse law. Congress had by law extended the provisions of the Indian intercourse act, so far as applicable, over this Territory and Oregon. Congress had also passed a donation law, inviting settlers to locate claims, first west, and then east of the Cascade mountains, and public surveys had been ordered to be made over this domain. But the Indian title had not been extinguished. This was a bitter cause of complaint on the part of the Indians. The Yakimas, Cayuses, and Walla-Wallas were anxious to make treaties, selling their lands to the government, and securing to themselves reservations for their permanent homes, and they asserted that until such treaties were made no settlers should come among them. These were the reasons of public policy which induced the government to enter into these treaties, and no time was lost in consummating them. The people of this Territory urged upon Congress the necessity of such a policy, and Congress made appropriation to carry out their wishes. It fell to my lot to be appointed the commissioner to negotiate these treaties. I entered upon those labors in December, a year ago, and

during that and the following month successfully treated with all the Indians upon the Sound, the Straits, and the Indians at Cape Flattery.

In January a year ago, I dispatched Jas. Doty, esq., east of the Cascade mountains, to ascertain the feelings and views of the Indians. He visited the Yakimas, the Cayuses, the Walla-Wallas, and the Nez Percés in their own country, and they were desirous to treat and sell their lands. Kamiakin advised the tribes to meet in council at Walla Walla, saying that was their old council ground. The council was convened, and lasted fourteen days. All those tribes were present. The greatest care was taken to explain the treaties, and the objects of of them, and to secure the most faithful interpreters. Three interpreters were provided for each language; one to act as principal interpreter, the other two to correct. At the close of that council, such expressions of joy and thankfulness I have never seen exhibited to a greater degree among Indians. Kamiakin, Peu-peu-mox-mox, the young chief Stiekas, and the Lawyer, all personally expressed their joy and satisfaction. Kamiakin asserted that personally he was indifferent about the treaty; but as his people all wanted it, he was for it, and that was the reason he assented to the treaty. The record of that council was made up by intelligent and dispassionate men, and the speeches of all, there made, are recorded verbatim. The dignity, humanity, and justice of the national government are there signally exhibited, and none of the actors therein need fear the criticism of an intelligent community, nor the supervision of intelligent superiors. By these treaties, had the Indians been faithful to them, the question as to whether the Indian tribes of this Territory can become civilized and christianized beings, would have been determined practically, and as to whether the intervention of an Indian service, for the supervision of the Indians, might not become unnecessary, in consequence of the Indians being able to govern themselves. This spirit lies at the basis of all the treaties made in this Territory.

Another council followed, in which three considerable tribes were convened, which lasted eight days—the Indians, at the close, again expressing the utmost joy and satisfaction. It is due to gentlemen of the legislative assembly to make this frank and full statement. The printed record will show that the authorities and the people of this Territory have nothing to blush for, nothing to fear in the judgment of impartial men, now living, nor the rebuke of posterity.

As to the causes of this war, it is not a question necessary to dwell upon. It has been conclusively demonstrated, that it has been plotting for at least two or three years. I am frank to admit, that had I known when the council at Walla-Walla was convened what I learned afterwards, I should not have convened that council. I learned from one of the fathers, some days after it had commenced, and I was satisfied that his information was correct, from the deportment of several of the principal chiefs, that many of the Indians came to that council with hostile feelings. But when I left Walla-Walla, I thought that by the treaty such feelings were entirely assuaged—that those who were once for war were now for peace.

It is difficult to see how such a combination should have existed

and not have been known; and yet it extended from the Sound to the Umpqua—from one side to the other of the Cascade mountains.

Fellow citizens! War has existed for three months, and still exists. A war entered into by these Indians, without a cause; a war having not its origin in these treaties, nor in the bad conduct of our people. It originated in the native intelligence of restless Indians, who, foreseeing destiny against them, that the white man was moving upon them, determined that it must be met and resisted by arms. We may sympathize with such a manly feeling, but in view of it we have high duties.

I will not dwell upon the efforts made, the false reports circulated, distorting the proceedings of these councils; the stories of killing friendly Indians, which those hostile have resorted to, to spread hostility. The war exists; the question is—How shall it be met? There are duties to be discharged, difficulties to be grappled with. The war must be vigorously prosecuted now. Seed time is coming, and the farmer should be at his plough in the field. The summer is coming. The snows will melt in your mountain passes. It seems to me the warm season is not the time for operations. Day-light is breaking upon us. The gloom which for a time hung over us is giving way. There has been great energy displayed in handling the whole question. Judgment and energy in driving back, into a comparatively small region of country, the hostile Indians, and in keeping the great body of the Indians entirely friendly.

The work remaining to be done is comparatively small. It is my opinion that it would be expedient forthwith to raise a force of three hundred men, from the Sound, to push into the Indian country, build a depot, and vigorously operate against the Indians in this quarter; and nearly the same force should be raised on the Columbia river, to prosecute the war east of the Cascade mountains. This last would have a vast influence upon the operations in this section. It would prevent reinforcements from either side joining the bands on the other side, and would effectually crush both. But what is more important, would be the influence upon the numerous tribes not yet broken out into hostility. It is due to you to state what experience in travelling through the Indian country has taught me. There is a surprising feeling of uneasiness among all the tribes who have not broken out, except, alone, the Nez Percés. These tribes may be led into war if delay attends our operations.

I regret on this occasion to be compelled to criticise the official acts of a gallant and war-worn veteran, one whose name has been on the historic rolls of the country for nearly half a century. But it is due to the people and the authorities of the Territory of Washington that the facts should appear and be known to the national government. Gov. Mason, in obedience to the requisition of the commanding officer of the United States forces upon the Columbia river, raised two companies of volunteers, of excellent material. They were well mounted and ready for the field. Another company was raised to protect the commissioner appointed by the President of the United States to make treaties with the Indian tribes in the interior of the continent. These troops were disbanded, were brought down into

garrison, and the regulars were kept in garrison. And there stands out the broad fact, that seven hundred Indians in the Walla-Walla valley were met and defeated by volunteers, when the regulars were in garrison. The President's commissioner, a high functionary, deriving his powers from the President of the United States, and not from any department, was left without protection, and the troops raised to protect him Major General Wool thought proper to disband and bring into garrison. That officer acted unquestionably from a sense of duty. His reputation as a gallant soldier, his long and valuable services to the country, cannot be disputed. I do not wish to impugn his motives. I only desire to submit facts for the judgment of superiors at home.

I learn, from good authority, that his plan of operations is to delay till spring, probably until May. It is well known by those who have experience and knowledge of their country, that February and March are the best months for the prosecution of this war. I think it due to the legislative assembly to state the reasons why all voyageurs, and gentleman of experience in these matters, give it as their opinion that now is the proper time for action. There is a vast plain between the Cascade and Bitter Root mountains. The Columbia, Snake, Clear Water, and Spokane rivers are to be crossed. The snow is but a few inches deep, and lasts but a short time—seldom over a fortnight. There is but one continuous period of cold weather, and that period has now passed. The mountain passes are all closed up with snows, which can only be scaled by snow-shoes. For these reasons the Indians cannot escape, should vigorous operations be made. On these plains our forces can operate well. There is abundant fuel for camps, grass for animals, and the rivers are low. The Indians must be struck now. But if we delay, in a few months the roots and fish will abound, supplying the Indians with food. The snows will melt, and the mountain passes will allow them hiding places. It is my opinion, if operations are deferred till summer they must be deferred till winter again.

What effect would it have on the Sound should nothing be done until May or June? The whole industrial community would be ruined; the Sound paralyzed; the husbandman would be kept in a state of suspense by rumors of war, and could not adhere to his pursuits; fields would not be tilled, and the Territory would starve out.

I am of the opinion that vigorous operations should be prosecuted on both sides of the Cascade mountains. Whenever it is practicable or expedient, it is best that volunteers should be mustered into the United States service. It should go to the authorities at home, that we endeavored to co-operate with the regular service. But there has been a breach of faith. Troops mustered into service were disbanded, in violation of a positive understanding; and it is now proper that the authorities of this Territory should conduct the movements of their own troops—co-operating with the regulars where such co-operations can be effective. I therefore do not think the volunteers of this Territory should be mustered into the United States service. I am ready to take the responsibility of raising them, independent of that service, and it is due to the Territory, and to myself, that the reasons for



assuming it should go to the President and the departments at Washington.

The spirit of prosecuting this war should be to accomplish a lasting peace—not to make treaties, but to punish their violation.

Gentlemen of the legislative assembly: I have done my duty. It was a pleasant feeling that actuated me on my mission, in making these treaties, to think I was doing something to civilize and render the condition of the Indian happier; and while justice and merey should characterize the acts of our government, there should be no weakness—no imbecility. In nations, as well as individuals, we may apply the precept—a man who has deceived you once should not again be trusted. Let the blow strike where it is deserved. I am opposed to any treaties; I shall oppose any treaties with these hostile bands. I will protest against any and all treaties made with them; nothing but death is a mete punishment for their perfidy—their lives only should pay the forfeit. A friendly Nez Percé informed me that in the Cayuse tribe nineteen ill-disposed persons caused all the trouble. Could these be punished, the tribe could be governed. These turbulent persons should be seized and put to death. The tribes now at war must submit unconditionally to the justice, merey, and leniency of our government. The guilty ones should suffer, and the remainder placed upon reservations, under the eye of the military. In a few years the policy might be changed. By such a decisive, energetic and firm course, the difficulty may be grappled with and peace restored.

Let not our hearts be discouraged. I have an abiding confidence in the future destiny of our Territory. Gloom must give way to sunlight. Let us never lose sight of the resources, capacities, and natural advantages of the Territory of Washington. We have an interior, soon to be filled up with settlements. Gold in considerable quantities has been discovered in the northern part of that interior. There are fine grazing tracts and rich agricultural vallies, and that interior *will fill up* when these Indian difficulties are at an end. Then, too, will the Sound resume its prosperity. Gather heart, then, fellow citizens. Do not now talk of leaving us in our hour of adversity, but stay till the shade of gloom is lifted, and await that destiny to be fulfilled. Let us all put hands together and rescue the Territory from its present difficulties, so that we all may feel that we had done our whole duty in the present exigency.

ISAAC I. STEVENS,  
*Governor, and Supt. Ind Aff's, Wash. Ter.*

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*The Governor of Washington to the Secretary of War.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, WASHINGTON TERRITORY,  
*Olympia, March 9, 1856.*

SIR: Referring to my previous communication, setting forth the necessity of calling out volunteers to protect our settlements, and to co-operate with our regular troops in waging war upon the hostile

Indians, I have the honor to submit for the information of the department the present condition of the volunteer service.

The general plan of operations, and the staff arrangements made to give efficiency to the service, will be shown in General Orders No. 4, herewith enclosed.

It will thus appear that three battalions are to operate against the enemy.

The northern battalion is now rendezvousing at the falls of the Snoqualmie, will number about ninety men, and will be supported by Pat Kanim and his band of nearly one hundred friendly Indians. This battalion is ordered to establish block houses on the prairie above the falls of the Snoqualmie, and on Cedar creek; will be supplied with sixty days' provisions, and will prevent the Indians either crossing over the mountains by the passes of the Snoqualmie, or going down the Snohomish, to tamper with the friendly Indians on the reservations.

The central battalion, under Major Gilmore Hays, is now established at Connell's prairie, on the south side of White river, a block house and corral has been built, and the communication with the rear is secured by a ferry and block house on the Puyallup, and by block houses at Montgomery's and on the Yelm prairie. They have one hundred days' supplies of provisions, taken in by ox-teams, which have since been withdrawn, and will immediately establish block houses at the crossing of White river, to communicate with the regular force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Casey, on the Muckleshoot prairie, and at Porter's, higher up on White river.

The cordial relations between the regulars and volunteers, mentioned in my last communication, still continue, and I have every assurance that our volunteers will do their duty.

The department will observe that one of the companies of this battalion is a company of pioneers. They are experienced axemen, and have rendered the most efficient service in opening roads and building block houses. The war will be emphatically a war of block houses.

In the movement of the troops upon the Muckleshoot, a decisive battle was fought with the Indians, in which the latter were signally defeated. Their establishment at Porter's has since been broken up, and they have been driven towards Green river. If they continue their retreat further, they will be met by the volunteers and friendly Indians of the northern battalion.

The southern battalion is still organizing, but their march to the interior will be delayed for a short time, in consequence of my finding myself obliged to order more than one company to the defence of the Sound. A band of hostiles, under the notorious Qui-c-muth, had, unknown to us, established themselves in the Nisqually bottom, within twelve miles of this place and the garrison at Steilacoom. We became aware of their presence one week since, they having on that day killed one of our citizens.

One of the teamsters had been for some days missing, and that he also had been killed was ascertained the same day. The whole force of the central battalion, except fifteen men, was then in the Indian country on White river. Immediately an express was dispatched to

the Columbia river, ordering Captain Maxon's mounted company to the Sound, and to-night his company will be at Jackson's, ninety miles on the road. The rapidity of the movement is the best evidence of the necessity of action, and the disposition of the troops to obey orders. In the meantime, I have raised the force of fifteen men to sixty, and, in addition, have sent twenty-nine friendly Indians into the field. These Indians are led by experienced white men.

These hostiles have, within ten days, driven off much stock, and have alarmed our entire settlements; we hope soon to rout them. It is necessary, however, to have considerable guards to all our trains. The mail from the Columbia river came in on Friday, with an escort of four men.

The danger is not so much from the harm which this band may of its own strength do, as it numbers not over forty warriors, but from the facility with which it may communicate with the friendly Indians on the reservations, and stir them up to hostility. Seattle is held by a company of volunteers, consisting of forty odd men, commanded by the chief justice of the Territory, Lieutenant Colonel Lander.

Lone Free Point, which commands a trail from the camp of the hostiles to the Sound, whence they may communicate with the reservations, is also held by a volunteer force of ten men. They have built a substantial block house.

Our people are not discouraged. Wherever four families are, they will build a block house, hold it against the Indians, and endeavor to get in their crops. Over one half of the able-bodied men on the Sound are bearing arms; our people have patriotically placed at the disposal of the authorities all their available means. We need aid from the general government—ample appropriations to defray the expenses of the war.

I have refused to receive into service a single man for local defence; all are enlisted for six months, subject to the orders of the executive.

In this way an effectual stop has been put to any attempt to enrol troops for nominal service, with a view of extorting pay and rations from the government.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,

*Governor Territory of Washington.*

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS,

*Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

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GENERAL ORDERS—No. 4.

1st. The 2d regiment of Washington Territory volunteers, called into the service of the United States against the Yakima and other hostile Indian tribes, will be organized into three battalions, to be designated respectively the northern, the central, and southern battalions.

2d. The northern battalion includes company G, commanded by

Captain Van Bokkelin; company I, Captain Howe; a detachment of company H, Captain Peabody, and will be commanded by a major, to be elected by the command upon its concentration.

3d. It will receive supplies and transportation from Quartermaster and Commissary Robinson, and move immediately up the river to the Snoqualmie falls.

4th. The central battalion, commanded by Major Gilmore Hays, will comprise company B, Captain Rabbeson; company C, Captain Henness, (mounted rangers;) the train guard, Captain Shead, and the pioneer company, commanded by Captain White, with detachment of scouts, commanded by Captain Swindall, of company F, and be supplied by Quartermaster and Commissary Weed, at the post of Olympia.

5th. This battalion will march to the Muckleshoot prairie, establishing block houses at the Yelm prairie, at Montgomery's station, and the crossing of the Puyallup river, and, forming a junction with the regulars, erect a depot, hospital, and block house at or near the forks of White and Green rivers.

6th. The southern battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shaw, will organize from the companies now forming by Captains Maxen, Achilles, Higgins, and Pearson, upon the Columbia river, and will march to the Walla-Walla valley as soon as possible.

7th. The southern battalion will be supplied by Quartermaster and Commissary Hathaway, at Fort Vancouver.

8th. Officers commanding battalions will appoint adjutants for their commands.

9th. The battalion adjutant will conduct the military correspondence, make the necessary reports to this office, and keep the papers of the battalion.

10th. Quartermasters and commissaries will make their reports to Quartermaster and Commissary General Miller, at Olympia.

11th. Lieutenant Colonel Lander, commanding post at Seattle, will organize company A, of the 2d regiment of Washington Territory volunteers, with as many friendly Indians as may report to him, and make war upon the hostile savages infesting the forests between Elliott's bay and the country lying adjacent to Seattle, and co-operate with the naval forces now in the bay of Seattle, and will be supplied by Quartermaster and Commissary F. Mathias.

12th. Jared S. Hurd and H. R. Crosbie, esq., are appointed aids to the commander-in-chief, with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

13th. Eustis Huger is appointed acting adjutant to the 2d regiment W. T. volunteers, with the rank of first lieutenant.

14th. Sidney S. Ford, jr., is appointed a captain, and detached for the special service of organizing a force of friendly Indians of the Chehalis and Cowlitz tribes for operation upon the Puyallup.

15th. Captain C. W. Riley, with the force raised in Steilacoom, will build a fort at "Lone Tree Point," north of the mouth of the Puyallup, and occupy that post until further orders.

16th. Warren Gove is appointed quartermaster and commissary at the post of Steilacoom.

17th. A. H. Robie is appointed quartermaster and commissary of subsistence at the Dalles.

18th. G. K. Willard to be surgeon and purveyor of medicine and medical stores at headquarters.

19th. M. P. Burns is appointed a surgeon in the 2d regiment, and ordered for duty with the central battalion.

20th. Dr. R. M. Bigelow, surgeon for the northern battalion.

21st. The officer commanding the southern battalion will appoint a surgeon for his command, and report his name to this office, that a commission may issue.

22d. Edward Furste is appointed chief clerk to the quartermaster and commissary general.

23d. James Roberts is appointed military clerk to the office of the commander-in-chief.

24th. In all service of combined volunteer and Indian military forces, the military officer will take command of the whole.

25th. All officers commanding are requested to make reports to this office as frequently as practicable.

By order of the governor and commander-in-chief.

JAMES TILTON,

*Adjutant General W. T. Volunteer Forces.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Olympia, W. T., February 25, 1856.*

*The Governor of Washington to the Secretary of War.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON,  
*Olympia, March 21, 1856.*

SIR: In my two reports, of February 19 and March 9, I laid before the department the circumstances of my return from the Blackfeet country, the condition of the Territory, and the measures taken by me to call out volunteers and to apply them to the prosecution of the war. I now propose to lay before the department a full view of the whole matter, and to indicate the measures which, in my judgment, are still necessary to protect these distant settlements, and to inflict that summary chastisement upon the Indians demanded both by their unprovoked atrocities and the permanent peace of the country.

I have caused two maps to be prepared; one of the country west of the Cascades, showing the points now occupied by that portion of the friendly Indians who, for five months, have been under the charge of local agents; the lines occupied by the regular troops now in the field under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Casey; the point occupied by the naval forces; the lines occupied by the volunteer forces now in the field; the block houses occupied by our citizens; the lines of supplies; the depots for their protection; the country occupied by the hostiles; the lines over which reinforcements can come to them from east of the Cascades; and one of the country east of the Cascades, showing the tribes, the lines of communication, and the points at the

latest advices occupied by the hostiles. The number of souls and of warriors will be shown on this map.

A glance at the first map will show that the citizens of the Territory have, for the protection of their families, and to get in and harvest their crops, and in connexion with the military service of the Territory, built some thirty-three block houses and depots. Of these some are large establishments. Fort Henniss, in Mound prairie, is a large stockade, with block houses at the alternate corners, with buildings inside affording shelter to all the families of that flourishing settlement. At Nathan Eaton's the defences consist of sixteen log buildings in a square, facing inwards, the object being not only to collect the families for protection, but to send out a scouting party of some fifteen men when marauders are in the vicinity.

This point is within four miles of the Nisqually bottom, which was the headquarters for four weeks of a band of hostiles, and is central to many Indian trails.

On Skocham bay there is an establishment of the same character, and nearly as large as Fort Henniss. The latter was built by one of the volunteer companies of the new levies, but the former entirely by the citizens, without any aid from the territorial authorities.

The settlements are now so secured by block houses that the citizens will hold them, even should every Indian in the Sound become hostile, and be reinforced by large bands from the north.

The whole country on the eastern shore of the Sound, from the Shookum creek to Snow-how-mish, is a war ground. No friendly Indian is allowed there except he has a pass from an authorized agent stating his specific business, or he be connected with the military and naval service. Two parties of Indian auxiliaries are now in the field, besides which, quite a number of Indians are employed as spies, guides, and in canoe service.

I will now give you a condensed view of the present condition of the military operations on the sound.

1. The regular troops now occupy the Muckleshoot prairie as their central position. The line of communication to Steilacoom is secured by a block house and ferry at the crossing of the Puyallup. A company has been sent to Seattle to move up the Duamish and open a communication with the central position. A block house will be established at the mouth of Cedar creek, and probably one at John Thomas'. The force under Lieutenant Colonel Casey has been very active, and this gallant officer has made the most favorable impression upon our people.

2. The naval forces occupy Seattle. This place is also held by a company of volunteers, who, for some days, have been under orders to occupy the line of the Dunamish, and who, in that duty, will co-operate with the company sent there by Lieutenant Colonel Casey.

3. The northern battalion have their headquarters at Fort Tilton, near the falls of the Sno-qual-mie. They number about ninety white men, and about the same number of friendly Indians, under Pat Kannim. They will establish block houses in the prairie above the falls and on Cedar creek, and will extend their scouts to the Muckleshoot and Dunamish.



4. To circumscribe the field occupied by the enemy, I have suggested to Captain Swartwout, in command of the naval forces, a joint operation upon the lake back of Seattle, a block house to be built on the lake at the nearest point to Seattle, a good road opened with Seattle, and boats from the navy, with one hundred men, to be placed on the lake. Captain Swartwout does not, however, by his instructions, feel authorized either to co-operate with the military authorities of the Territory, or to take part in any operation carrying his force away from the immediate shore of the Sound. I enclose a copy of my letter to Captain Swartwout and of his reply thereto.

5. The central battalion have their headquarters at Cornell's prairie and at Porter's. The communication with the rear is received by a block house and ferry, at the crossing of the Puyallup, and block houses at Montgomery's, at the Yellem Prairie, at Nathan Eaton's, and Jones'. This battalion numbers in the field, including the garrison of Yellem and Montgomery's and the crossing of the Puyallup, about 150 men.

6. Our supplies are drawn mainly from the country between this point and the Cowlitz landing. The route is well secured by block houses.

7. Lone Tree Point is also held by a volunteer force of ten men. It guards several important trails.

8. Bellingham Bay has its block house defended by fifteen men of Captain Peabody's company.

9. The southern battalion, on its arrival on the Sound, will be for the most part dismounted and sent to reinforce the central battalion. The two battalions will then operate up White river, towards the Nachess pass, co-operating with Lieutenant Colonel Casey.

The map of the country east of the Cascades will show the large number of Indians already hostile, or who may be incited to hostility, the ease with which they may communicate with each other, the great number of excellent trails, the large extent of country embraced in the theatre of operations, and the facility with which reinforcements can be sent over the Cascades.

Hence the importance of the most vigorous and decisive blows to get possession of the whole country east of the Sound, now invested with the savages, and to hold in our hands the routes over the Cascades, before they become practicable in May, and hence the necessity of the most vigorous measures east of the Cascades, in order that the Indians may be simultaneously struck in the Yakima country.

It is probable that the hostile Indians rather exceed the minimum estimate of two hundred men, as stated in my memoir to General Wool, a copy of which has been sent to the department, but I do not think they will be found to exceed three hundred men.

Their headquarters have been on the Muckleshoot prairie, now occupied by Lieutenant Colonel Casey, and now they have moved up either White or Green river. But there are bands also on the lake back of Seattle, and probably of Cedar creek.

The map will show that the hostiles are only within a few hours distance of every reservation. There are many trails known only to

the Indians, and it will not be possible, in any contingency, entirely to prevent communication.

From the hostile camps marauding parties can steal out, and turning the heads of the Puyallup and Nisqually, they can, in from six to twelve hours, strike any settlement from Steilacoom to the Cowlitz landing. More than this, there are places where they can on this line of settlements establish themselves, and for many days defy all our efforts to drive them out.

Consider the face of the country, prairies and heavy timber, and many streams, almost impenetrable brushwood on the banks, and heavy drift along either shore, there is not a road or trail of twenty miles in the whole Sound country which does not afford one or more excellent ambuscades.

Between this place and Cowlitz landing are two Indian reservations. The Chehalis and Cowlitz. The former can easily be incited to hostility and they number a little more than one hundred warriors. We know of some three or four men who are endeavoring to stir up the tribe to war. My plan has been to get up a small auxiliary force of some fifteen of the best men of the tribe, who make scouts every few days towards the head of the Shookum-chuck. It has been found to work well. The difficulty is, that if the men of the tribe, believed to be in alliance with "Leschi," were summarily disposed of, the whole tribe would break out. We have no positive evidence, except the impression of their commander, Captain Ford, who is of opinion, that in his last trip ten of the men tried to kill him. He has great daring and presence of mind, and he believes he can prevent an outbreak.

So of the reservation opposite Olympia, Lieutenant Gosnell has made one scout in the Nisqually bottom of ten days, with fourteen Indians. Yesterday morning he started out on a scout of three days, with thirty Indians. The effect of the first scout was salutary. Such will, I doubt not, be the effect of the second. Yet on the first scout Lieutenant Gosnell went with his life in his hands. Some of his Indians were more than suspected, and he went with them alone.

The most melancholy feature of this war is that the Indians who have taken the lead in murdering our men, our women, and our children were those who have received the most favors from the whites, and were held by them in the most consideration. Many cases have occurred of Indians killing their friends and benefactors. Are you surprised that a general distrust of all Indians pervades the public mind? Therefore, consider the task which has been imposed upon the territorial authorities, to see to it that the Indians not taking part with the hostiles are treated as friends.

In short, the whole country is a frontier, within a few hours of the camp of the hostile Indians, and with four thousand friendly Indians in our midst, of whose faith we cannot be certain.

Our safety lies in two things: first, to carry the war against the hostiles with the whole force of the Territory, and to bring them to unconditional submission; and, second, to give no cause of offence to the friendly Indians, even in the cases of persons more than suspected.

You have served in an Indian country, and know something of In-

dian modes of thinking, and can appreciate that, when, in a contest like this, troops have once entered the field, they must not be withdrawn till they have accomplished the object for which they were sent into the field. There must be no changes of plan. We must push forward and do the work we have undertaken, else the Indian will say *he* has driven us from the field, and thereby get large accessions from tribes who otherwise would continue friendly.

General Wool has recently visited this Sound, and, with a full knowledge of the course taken by me in calling out the volunteers of the Territory, of the cordial spirit of co-operation between Lieutenant Colonel Casey and myself, and of the fact that the volunteers were actually in the field engaging the enemy, has ignored effectually the necessity of this, but has practically admitted it in directing Colonel Casey to make a requisition upon me for two companies of volunteers. This requisition I have refused to comply with, for reasons which will be found in my letter to Colonel Casey and Major General Wool, herewith enclosed.

Those reasons, it seems to me, are conclusive, and they show the necessity of removing from the command of the department of the Pacific a man who has by his acts, so far as this Territory is concerned, shown an utter incapacity.

I will most respectfully call your attention to my letter to General Wool, and to his letter to which mine was an answer, and I simply ask that justice may be done between us.

So long as I am the governor of Washington, and till I receive instructions from my superiors, I shall pass on in the path indicated in that letter to General Wool.

I beg leave respectfully to recapitulate, briefly, the points of difference.

1. General Wool states that the movement of the Oregon volunteers was entirely unnecessary, and precipitated the Walla-Walla and other tribes into hostility.

I assert that this movement probably saved my party from destruction, and that the Indians then hostile had been so even before the Oregon volunteers moved against them.

2. General Wool states that Governor Curry had no right to move his troops into the Territory of Washington.

I assert, and have shown, that the Oregon volunteers fought the Indians mainly of Oregon, and that, near the confines of the two Territories.

3. General Wool states, that if the Oregon volunteers are withdrawn, he will have no trouble in managing affairs and keeping the Nez Percés friendly.

I state, officially, to General Wool and to the department, that the Nez Percés are in my hands, and that without an armed man I will undertake to keep the Nez Percés friendly, if General Wool does not interfere with me in the management of these Indians. But I also state that General Wool, in addition to his regular force, will require the best efforts of the Oregon volunteers, to *strike such blows this spring and summer as will protect the settlements*. He can do nothing more.

He must wait till next winter to strike blows to end the war east of the Cascades. I refer to my memoir.

The department will thus see that I consider the war east of the Cascades of great magnitude, and that it would have been vastly greater were it not for the concurrence of two things. 1st. The movement of the Oregon volunteers to the Walla-Walla valley; and 2d. My return *by the direct route, and not by the way of New York.*

It is simply an exigency to be met, and met by all the authorities in the spirit of cordial co-operation, looking to the public good alone, without any reference to personal considerations.

I have therefore suggested to General Wool the necessity of recognizing the services of the Oregon volunteers; but I expect nothing from him, and I shall therefore take my own course, with the determination that if disasters shall occur, not a tittle of the responsibility shall be attached to me.

The war here must be ended as rapidly as possible, and all the disposable force kept in the field till the enemy's country is occupied and his force be scattered.

All our horsemen must then be ready to cross the Cascades to move against the hostiles, who may then, with greatly superior numbers, be encountering the troops.

I have therefore ordered all the troops from the Columbia valley to to the Sound, and have directed a train of 100 pack animals and 40 wagons to be ready to cross the Nachess the last of May.

I have ordered that supplies and transportation be engaged, to place in depot at Walla-Walla 75 days' provisions for 250 men.

The Oregon volunteers have crossed Snake river, and have already probably struck the enemy. Should they succeed in striking, on their return, the enemy in the Yakima country, and should the movement be followed up by the regular troops, I trust that my operations will be confined to the country on the Sound.

Should, however, nothing decisive be done in the Yakima country till the passes are open, our situation here will be critical, and the defence of the Sound, as regards the Indians east of the Cascades, may be best accomplished by waging war against them in their own country.

I have looked to this exigency from the beginning; hence volunteers were raised for six months; have supplies and transportation for the same period. But we will be prepared for the worst and hope for the best.

The following papers accompany this report:

1. Copy of General Wool's reply of February 12, 1856, to my memoir to him of the 23d December and 29th January. This memoir has already been transmitted to the War Department.

2. Copy of my answer to this reply, dated March.

3. Copy of my letter to General Wool, on his arrival at Steilacoom, introducing Adjutant General Tilton, and expressing my desire to co-operate with the regular service.

4. Copy of Lieutenant Colonel Casey's letter, calling on me for two companies of volunteers.

5. Copy of my answer to the same, declining to call out the companies.

6. A copy of my letter to Captain Swartwout, commanding naval forces in the Sound, proposing a combined movement of the military and naval forces.

7. Copy of Captain Swartwout's letter, declining to co-operate.

I have thus endeavored to lay before the department the condition of affairs, and the measures of preparation and precaution taken by me to protect our suffering people, and I have the honor, sir, to be, very respectfully, your most obedient,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,  
*Governor Territory of Washington.*

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS,  
*Secretary of War, Washington City.*

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No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,  
*Benicia, California, February 12, 1856.*

SIR: I received your communication of the 23d of December, and 29th January, 1856, on the 6th instant, but too late to reply to it by the return steamer. For the information which it imparts you have my thanks. When you know my instructions to Colonel Wright, of the 9th infantry, at Vancouver, you will discover that many of your suggestions have been anticipated. In presenting, however, your plan of campaign, which is a very extended one, you should have recollected that I have neither the resources of a Territory, nor the Treasury of the United States, at my command. Still you may be assured that the war against the Indians will be prosecuted with all the vigor, promptness and efficiency I am master of, at the same time without wasting unnecessarily the means and resources at my disposal by untimely and unproductive expeditions. With the additional force which recently arrived at Vancouver and at the Dalles, I think I shall be able to bring the war to a close in a few months, provided the extermination of the Indians, which I do not approve of, is not determined on, and private war prevented, and the volunteers withdrawn from the Walla-Walla country.

Whilst I was in Oregon it was reported to me, that many citizens, with a due proportion of volunteers, and two newspapers, advocated the extermination of the Indians. This principle has been acted on in several instances, without discriminating between enemies and friends, which has been the cause in southern Oregon of sacrificing many innocent and worthy citizens. As in the case of Major Lupton and his party, (volunteers,) who killed twenty-five Indians, eighteen of whom were women and children. These were friendly Indians, on their way to the Indian reservation, where they expected protection from the whites. This barbarous act is the cause of the present contest in the Rogue River country, and as Captain Judah, U. S. A., reports, is retaliatory of the conduct of Major Lupton.

By the same mail which brought me your communication, I received

one—now before me, from a person who I think incapable of misrepresentation—which informs me that the friendly Cayuses are every day menaced with death by Governor Curry's volunteers. The writer says they have despoiled these Indians—who have so nobly followed the advice of Mr. Palmer to remain faithful friends to the Americans—of their provisions. To-day he says these same volunteers, without discipline and without orders, are not yet satisfied with rapine and injustice, and wish to take away the small remnant of animals and provisions left. Every day they run off the horses and cattle of the friendly Indians. These have become indignant, and will not be much longer restrained from resisting conduct so unworthy of the whites, who have made them so many promises to respect and protect them if they remained faithful friends. The writer further says, if the volunteers are not arrested in their brigand actions, the Indians will save themselves by flying to the homes of their relations, the Nez Percés, who have promised them help, and then all the Indians of Oregon and Washington would join in the common defence. This information is in a great measure confirmed by a person who, I am assured, enjoys your respect and confidence.

I need not say, although I had previously instructed Colonel Wright to take possession of the Walla-Walla country at the earliest moment practicable, that I directed him to give protection as soon as he could to the friendly Cayuses from the depredations of the volunteers. It is such conduct as here complained of that irritates and greatly increases the ranks of the hostile tribes; and if the Nez Percés join in the war against us, which I hope to prevent, we shall require a much larger force than we now have in Washington and Oregon Territories to resist savage barbarities and to protect the whites.

I have recently sent to Puget Sound two companies of the 9th infantry. These, with the three companies there, will give a force of nearly or quite four hundred regulars, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Casey. This force, with several ships of war in the Sound, to which will be added, in a few days, the United States steamer Massachusetts, it seems to me, if rightly directed, ought to be sufficient to bring to terms two hundred Indian warriors. Captain Keyes, in his last report received, says there are not quite two hundred in arms in that region. Lieutenant Colonel Casey has been directed to prosecute the war with the greatest vigilance and activity. The gallant Captain Swartwout, who goes in the Massachusetts, commander-in-chief of the naval forces in the Sound, will, I am assured, zealously, efficiently, and, I trust, successfully co-operate with Colonel Casey to bring the war to a close.

In regard to the operations east of the Cascade mountains, if Governor Curry's volunteers have not driven the friendly Cayuses and the Nez Percés into the ranks of the hostile tribes, (and they should be withdrawn from the Walla-Walla country,) I have great hopes that I shall be able to bring the Indians in that region to terms, notwithstanding the volunteers killed the chief, Pec-pec-mox-mox, scalped him, cut off his ears and hands, as reported by volunteers, and sent them to their friends in Oregon. All this, too, after he met them under a flag of truce, declaring he "was for peace, that he did not



wish to fight, that his people did not wish to fight," and that if any of his young men had done wrong he would make restitution, while he at the same time offered the volunteers cattle for food. Such conduct may have caused feelings difficult to overcome. I trust, however, I will be able to do it.

As soon as the war is terminated east of the Cascade mountains, I will be able to send all my disposable forces against the Indians in Rogue river and Puget Sound. It is, however, due to truth to say, at no time were volunteers required, or in any sense of the term necessary, for the defence of the inhabitants of Oregon, from the depredations or barbarities of Indians occupying the country east of the Cascade mountains. Nor was there any circumstance to justify Governor Curry in sending his troops from Oregon to Washington Territory to make war on the Walla-Wallas, from whom the Oregonians had no danger whatever to apprehend. On this subject I would refer you to the report of the Secretary of War, dated the 3d of December, relative to the affairs of the army, in which he says, "the department at this distance, and in the absence of more definite information, especially in regard to the extent of the combination among the hostile tribes, cannot judge what volunteer reinforcements to the regular troops may be necessary. This is a matter which must necessarily be left to the military commander in the department of the Pacific."

At the conclusion of your communication you say "it is due to frankness that I should state that I have determined to submit to the department the course taken by the military authorities in disbanding the troops raised in the Territory of Washington for my relief. No effort was made, although the facts were presented both to Major General Wool and Major Raines to send me assistance. The regular troops were all withdrawn into garrison, and I was left to make my way the best I could through tribes known to be hostile. It remains to be seen whether the commissioner, selected by the President to make treaties with Indians in the interior of the continent, is to be ignored and his safety left to chance."

In your "frankness" and determination to represent me to the department, I trust you will be governed by truth, and truth only. Perhaps it is equally due to frankness on my part to say, that your communication is the first that I have received in relation to yourself, or on any subject whatever touching the Indian war, from any civil functionary either in Washington or Oregon Territories; and I have received but one from the military, and that was from Colonel Nesmith, who requested me to furnish him with two howitzers, which I refused. I have only to add that I disbanded no troops raised for your relief; and your communication gave me the first intelligence that any were raised for such a purpose.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL,  
*Major General.*

To his Excellency ISAAC I. STEVENS,  
*Governor of Washington Territory.*

No. 2.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, WASHINGTON TERRITORY,  
*Olympia, March 20, 1856.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 12th February, and to state generally, in answer thereto, that the events of the past four weeks, in connexion with your own official course, affords satisfactory evidence that the most objectionable positions of your letter have been abandoned, and that you have finally become awakened to the true condition of the Indian war, and are seeking to make some amends for the unfortunate blunders of the past.

You have probably learned how much you have been misled in your views of the operations of the Oregon volunteers, and how much unnecessary sympathy you have wasted upon the infamous Pee-pee-mox-mox. For your own reputation have I felt pain at the statements made in your letter to me, for I am the authoritative witness in the case, and in the letter which submitted your own action, in refusing to send me succor, I have presented briefly the facts, showing the unmitigated hostility of that chief. I assert that I can prove, by incontestible evidence, that Pee-pee-mox-mox had been hostile for months; that he exerted his influence to effect a general combination of the tribes; that he plundered Walla-Walla and the settlers of the valley, distributing the spoils to his men and the neighboring tribes as war trophies; that he rejected the intercession of the friendly Nez Percés to continue peaceful; that he had sworn to take my life and cut off my party; and that he and the adjoining tribes of Oregon and Washington had taken up their military position as warriors at the proper points of the Walla-Walla valley; and all this before the volunteers of Oregon moved upon him.

Pee-pee-mox-mox was slain fairly. I have investigated that matter on the ground, having not only the testimony of the officers of the Oregon volunteers and the eye-witnesses of his death, but the testimony of the friendly Indians, both Cayuses and Nez Percés. He was not entrapped by a flag of truce. I, of course, reprobate the indignities subsequently committed upon his person.

Are you aware, sir, that the great victory achieved by the gallant volunteers of Oregon, in the Walla-Walla valley, was fought near the line separating the two Territories, and that more of the Indians of Oregon were engaged in it than the Indians of Washington? Your letter would seem to show that you were ignorant of this fact. Where, sir, did you derive your information?

Half the Walla-Wallas live permanently in Oregon; all the Umatillas; over one-half of the Cayuses; all the John Days, Des-chutes, and Tigh Indians.

These were the Indians that met the volunteers of Oregon, and all these Indians were, by an arrangement made between General Palmer and myself, under the charge of the Oregon agents.

These Indians were reinforced, after the first three days fight, by one hundred Palouses, detached from the force under Kam-ai-a-kin.

That some turbulent men of the Oregon volunteers have done injury to the friendly Cayuses, is unquestionable, and it is reprobated by the authorities and the citizens of both Territories. It has, however, been grossly exaggerated. Had, sir, the regulars moved up to Walla-Walla valley, as I most earnestly urged both Major Raines and Colonel Wright, both by letter and in person, these Indians would have been protected. They could not act because they had no authority from you.

The presence of a single company would have been sufficient. The responsibility, if evil follows, will attach, sir, to you as well as to the volunteers of Oregon.

The Nez Perces, though a portion live in Oregon, are, by the arrangement before referred to between General Palmer and myself, all under my administrative charge, and if left alone will continue friendly.

I have heard from them long since the friend to whom you allude. I have a staff officer in their country. They are organized for self protection, and if your operations are conducted with ordinary judgment, there will not a man of them join in the war. I have to refer you, sir, to my memoir for my views, which will be found to bear the test of experience, and I would advise you, sir, in considering that memoir to bear in mind, that, as regards the opinion of men, who with perhaps not very inferior abilities to your own, bring greater special experience, and a knowledge of the country and the Indians, to which you cannot pretend, it will be prudent not to despise them.

In your letter of the 12th January, you state, "I have recently sent to Puget's Sound two companies of the 9th infantry. These, with the three companies there, will give a force of nearly or quite four hundred regulars, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Casey. This force, with several ships of war in the Sound, to which will be added, in a few days, the United States steamer Massachusetts, it seems to me, if rightly directed, ought to be sufficient to bring to terms two hundred Indian warriors. Captain Keyes, in his last report received, says there are not quite two hundred in arms in that region."

Here you have expressed a very confident opinion; you thought proper to quote Captain Keyes as to the number of Indians. But you found it did not suit your purpose to refer to the requisitions he had made upon you for six additional companies, two of which only had been sent forward. Nor could you find time to refer to the fact that Colonel Casey had recommended, after the war was over, that eight companies should be permanently stationed for the protection of the Sound. You think volunteers entirely unnecessary. All this after having received from the executive of the Territory information as to the condition of the country.

It is now March, a month later, and you send two additional companies of regulars, and direct Colonel Casey to call upon me for two companies of volunteers. Thus have you practically acknowledged that you were wrong and that I was right, and thus have I your testimony as against yourself in vindication of the necessity of my calling out volunteers.

As regards this call for volunteers, it is to be presumed "that

Colonel Casey informed you that the whole available force of the Sound Territory was bearing arms, and that the great proportion of them were actively engaging the enemy; that, organized in two battalions, the northern battalion occupied the line of the Sno-how-mish, where they are establishing block houses and closing the passes of the Sno-qual-mie; that the central battalion was occupying the military road on the Nachess, in relation to which road and its military bearings your aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Arnold, will be able to give you full information; and that on both lines decisive blows had been struck; and, also, that it was beyond the ability of our citizens to raise an additional company of even fifty men to honor your requisition.

I have a right to hold you to a full knowledge of our condition here. If you say you were uninformed, then you are not fit for your position and should give place to a better man. If you were informed, then your measures, as a military man, manifest an incapacity beyond example.

Therefore, the call upon me for two companies of volunteers is a call upon me to withdraw the troops now in the field with sixty to eighty days' provisions, after decisive blows had been struck, and when everything is ready to strike *a*, and, perhaps, *the* decisive blow to end the war.

I am too old a soldier ever to abandon a well considered plan of campaign, or to do otherwise than to push forward, with all my energies, in the path marked out, promising, as it does, the speedy termination of the war; and, sir, I am too wary a man not to detect the snare which has been laid for me.

You never expected, sir, that the requisition would be complied with; you knew it was a practical impossibility. But not having the courage to acknowledge your error, it was resorted to, in the hope that my refusing your requisition might enable you to occupy my vantage ground and throw me on the defensive. I hold you, sir, to the facts of the case, clearly demonstrating, and by your own confession, too, the propriety of my course and the necessity, on my part, of a steady adherence to it.

I enclose a copy of my letter to Lieutenant Colonel Casey, in which my views in regard to this scheme of yours is given in full.

You have referred to the atrocities committed upon the friendly Indians by the whites. I know nothing of what has occurred in southern Oregon, but I have to state that no man, to my knowledge, in the Territory of Washington, advocates the extermination of the Indians. The authorities here have not only used every exertion to protect them, but their exertions have been completely successful. Did you learn, sir, in your brief visit to the Sound, that nearly four thousand friendly Indians have been moved from the *war ground on the eastern shore of the Sound and its vicinity* to the adjacent islands, and have for nearly five months been living in charge of local agents? That not an Indian, in the whole course of this war, has been killed by the whites, except in battle? That when a military commission, composed of a majority of volunteer officers, tried, some months since, eight Indians, only one was convicted, and that the sentence of death

passed upon him has not yet been executed? It is the good conduct of our people, sir, that has so strengthened the hands of the authorities, as to enable them to control these friendly Indians and prevent any considerable accession to the ranks of the hostile.

And yet we have daily rumors, and have had for the last five months, that this tribe and that would break out. For at times great uneasiness has prevailed amongst them; and they are Indians, and, as such, they sympathise with their brethren. But the course of the authorities has been firm, energetic, and decisive, commanding the confidence of the community and the affections of the Indians.

Besides these four thousand on reservations in charge of local agents, we have three thousand more, on the western shore of the Sound and on the Straits of Enea.

I have recently heard from the Nez Percés, the Cœur d'Alènes, and the Spokanes. The former are firm in their allegiance. But the Spokanes urge me to have a military force in the great prairie, between them and the hostile Indians, so these latter may not be driven to their country, and thus incite their young men to war.

The letter of Garry, the chief of the Spokanes, is a most plaintive and earnest call for help, so his hands may be strengthened in keeping his people to their plighted faith; and the coincidence is remarkable, that this Indian chief, a white man in education and views of life, should ask me to do the very thing I have urged upon you; for you will remember, in my memoir, I urge that the troops in operating against the Indians should be interposed between the friendly and hostile tribes, to prevent those now friendly from joining in the war. I have, sir, studied the character of these Indians, and my views as to the influence upon the friendly Indians, of the mode of carrying on the war against the hostiles, are confirmed by the only highly educated Indian of either Oregon or Washington, and the head chief of the very tribe in reference to which I made this recommendation and felt the most solicitude.

Not a word has ever passed between us in reference to the subject.

You are doubtless informed that the Indians have commenced offensive operations east of the Cascades, and have attacked the steamers plying between the Cascades and the Dalles, and the trains moving towards Walla-Walla.

This bold course will enable them to operate upon the Spokane, the Colvilles, the Okinckanes, the Lower Pend d'Oreilles, the Cœur d'Alènes, who have five hundred warriors, and the tribes north of the line, who had three to five hundred more, unless struck east of the Cascades before the close of May, you will have to meet a combination of from 1,800 to 2,000 warriors. Their families and stock will be in secure retreats in the mountains, and unless before that time the Indians here are completely subdued, the passes over the mountains secured by block houses, it will be within the range of probabilities, that a large portion of the friendly Indians on the Sound can be incited to hostilities. The Klikatats and Yakimas know all the passes of the Cascades, and can readily cross after the month of May. Hence the necessity of the most vigorous blows now, of no changes of plan, of having troops in the settlements, to guard against any sudden outbreak of the friendly Indians.

Two men have recently been killed within sixteen miles of the capital of the Territory, by a band of marauders who have only been driven out within the last few days.

It seems to me that the present condition of things imposes upon you the necessity of recognizing the services of the volunteers of the two Territories now in the field, and of your doing everything to facilitate their operations. But if you waste your exertions in the fruitless effort to induce either the authorities to withdraw their troops, to abandon their plan of campaign, in order to comply with your requisitions or to meet your peculiar notions, I warn you now, sir, that I, as the Governor of Washington, will cast upon you the whole responsibility of any difficulty which may arise in consequence, and that by my firm, steady and energetic course, and by my determination to co-operate with the regular service, whatever may be the provocation to the contrary, I will vindicate the justice of my course, and maintain my reputation as a faithful public servant. I warn you, sir, that unless your course is changed, you will have difficulties in relation to which your own salvation will be the firm and decided policy of the two Territories, whose services you have ignored, whose people you have calumniated, and whose respect you have long ceased to possess.

You have erred in your judgment as to volunteers being needed at all here, and, as I have before observed, in calling for volunteers after increasing a force deemed by you sufficient, two companies, you have vindicated the justice and necessity of my acts in organizing the people of the Territory, as its executive.

I have thus practically your own endorsement that I have judged rightly, when you were in error, and my judgment having thus been sanctioned in calling out volunteers, I prefer to rely upon it in the matter both of the number required and the organization which will give them the most efficiency.

Can you presume, sir, to be able to correct your opinions by a hasty visit to the Sound for a few hours, and do you expect that having taken my deliberate course, that I shall change my plans on a single intimation from you, without even a conference between us? Were you desirous, sir, to harmonize and unite the elements of strength on the Sound, you would have seen that it was your duty, at least, to have informed me of your presence, and to have invited me to a conference. There was ample time for it. For it was less difficult for me to reach you on receiving notice than Colonel Casey, and I have shown throughout the most anxious desire to co-operate with the regular service.

Whilst in the country in the fall and winter you complained that the authorities of the two Territories did not communicate with you, why did you not inform me of your presence in the Sound, on your arrival at Steilacoom?

I learned of your probable arrival by simply learning on Saturday morning, by my express, of your having left Vancouver, and I immediately dispatched the chief of my staff to wait upon you with a letter. But you were gone, and whether you did not know the courtesy due to the civil authorities of this Territory, who had taken the proper course to place themselves in relations with you, or whether



you were unwilling to meet a man whose safety you had criminally neglected, and whose general views you had been compelled to adopt, is a matter entirely immaterial to me.

I enclose a copy of the letter transmitted by the hands of the Adjutant General James Tilton, esq., the surveyor general of the Territory of Washington.

After the defeat of the Indians in the Walla-Walla valley, they were completely cowed, and for weeks spies only crossed the Snake river to examine the country. Gradually becoming emboldened, they have since come over in small parties, and got some small successes in running off horses, and now they have more than recovered from the prestige of that defeat. They are making attacks on the whole line of communication, and are now firm and united, more hopeful, and have more strength than when the war was commenced.

What, sir, would have been the effect if Governor Curry had not made the movement which you condemn, and my party with the friendly Nez Percés had been cut off. Sir, there would have been a hurricane of war between the Cascade and Bitter Root, and three thousand warriors would now be in arms. Every tribe would have joined, including the Snakes, and the spirit of hostility would have spread east of the Bitter Root to the Upper Pend d'Oreilles.

I believe, sir, I would have forced my way through the five or six hundred hostiles in the Walla-Walla valley with fifty odd white men and one hundred and fifty Nez Percés. Would you have expected it? Could the country expect it? And what was the duty of those having forces at their command? Governor Curry sent his volunteers, and defeated the enemy. You disbanded the company of Washington Territory volunteers raised especially to be sent to my aid.

I have reported your refusal to send me succor to the Department of War, and have given some of the circumstances attending that refusal. The company was under the command of Captain William McKay. Before your arrival, there was a pledge that it should be mustered into the regular service and sent to my assistance. Major Raines informed me that he did everything in his power to induce you to send it on. William McKay informs me that he called on you personally, and that you would do nothing. I am informed that your own aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Arnold, endeavored to get you to change your determination. What was your answer? "Governor Stevens can take care of himself." "Governor Stevens will go down the Missouri." "Governor Stevens will get aid from General Harney." "If Governor Stevens wants aid he will send for it." These were your answers, according to the changing humor of the moment.

And now, sir, in view of your assertion that you disbanded no troops raised for my relief, and that my communication gave you the first intelligence that any were raised for such a purpose, I commend the chalice to your own lips, "that I trust you will be governed" hereafter "by the truth, and the truth only."

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,

*Governor of Washington Territory.*

Major General JOHN E. WOOL,

*Commanding Pacific Division.*

## No. 3.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON,  
*Olympia, March 15, 1856.*

SIR: I have this morning heard of your arrival in the Territory of Washington, of your having left Vaneouver in a steamer for the Sound, and that you are now probably at Steilacoom.

In the discharge of my responsibilities as the highest federal officer of the Territory of Washington, and in view of my oath of office, I have called out a large force of volunteers and a band of Indian auxiliaries, who are now actively engaging the enemy in the field.

Actuated by no motive than the public good, I have endeavored to co-operate with the military and naval forces in the Sound, with the object that all and every available means of carrying on the war should be applied as a unit to its prosecution.

I therefore send the adjutant general of the volunteer forces, James Tilton, esq., to confer with you. He is instructed to advise you of the plan of operations which I have adopted, the force in the field, and the condition of the country.

I have to assure you of my desire to co-operate with you in any plans which you may think proper to adopt, and I shall be pleased to hear from you in reference to the prosecution of the campaign.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,  
*Governor and Commander-in-chief.*

Major General JOHN E. WOOL,  
*Commanding Pacific division.*

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No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS, PUGET SOUND,  
*District Fort Steilacoom, Washington Territory, March 15, 1856.*

SIR: I respectfully request that you will at once issue your proclamation, calling into the service of the United States two companies of volunteers, to serve on foot, for the period of four months, unless sooner discharged. Each company to consist of one captain, one first and one second lieutenant, four sergeants, four corporals, and seventy privates.

I wish both companies to be mustered into service at Fort Steilacoom.

The authority for calling for the above named troops has been given by the general commanding the department of the Pacific.

I received, yesterday, an accession of two companies of the ninth infantry. With this accession of force, and the two companies of volunteers called for, I am of the opinion that I shall have a sufficient

number of troops to protect this frontier, without the aid of those now in the service of the Territory.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,  
*Lieutenant colonel 9th infantry,*  
*commanding Puget Sound district.*

His Excellency I. I. STEVENS,  
*Governor Washington Territory,*  
*Olympia, Washington Territory.*

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No. 5.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, WASHINGTON TERRITORY,  
*Olympia, March 16, 1856.*

SIR: I have received your letter of the 15th instant, advising me of the accession to your command of two companies of regulars, and requesting me to issue my proclamation calling into the service of the United States two companies of volunteers, to serve on foot for the period of four months, unless sooner discharged. These companies you wish to be mustered into the service at Fort Steilacoom.

You also express the opinion that if this requisition be complied with you will have a sufficient number of troops to protect this frontier, without the aid of those now in the service of the Territory.

I am also advised that you have been authorized to make this requisition for troops by the general commanding the department of the Pacific.

You have been informed by me not only of the volunteer force which has been called out to protect the settlements and to wage war upon the Indians, but of the plan of campaign which I have adopted, of the position which these troops occupy, and of the blows already struck by them against the enemy.

I take it for granted that this information has been communicated to General Wool, and has been considered by him in his official action.

In the two visits which I have made to Steilacoom to confer with you, one of them made at great personal inconvenience, I have waived etiquette in my anxious desire to co-operate with the regular service. I have communicated unreservedly my plans and views, and have endeavored, so far as my sphere was concerned, to conduct affairs in a way to insure the whole force operating as a unit in the prosecution of the war.

I am happy to say that in our several intercourses and communications you have met me in the same spirit of co-operation, to the extent that the impression has been made upon my mind, that such disposition had been made of the volunteers, in your opinion, as to make them an efficient element in the general combination.

Now your requisition on me to issue my proclamation to call into the United States service two companies of volunteers, in connexion with the expression of your opinion, that if the call be complied with the services of the troops now in the service of the Territory may be

dispensed with, is, in fact, a call on me to withdraw all the troops now in the field with their sixty to eighty days' provisions, to abandon the block houses, to leave the settlements both north and south open to the attacks of the marauding Indians, and at the very moment when our troops were prepared to strike *a*, and, perhaps, *the* decisive blow, to abandon the campaign and re-organize anew.

Are you aware that, in the patriot response of the citizens of the Territory to the call of the executive, over one-half of our able bodied men are bearing arms; that the people are almost entirely living in block houses, and that it is entirely beyond the ability of our citizens to organize an additional company of even fifty men.

The two companies you call for can, therefore, not be raised, except by the withdrawal of the troops, and abandoning the campaign at the very moment the prospects are flattering to end the war.

For these reasons alone it will be impossible to comply with your requisition, nor can I suppose that in making the requisition either Major General Wool, or yourself, believed for a moment that the requisition would be seriously entertained by me.

But I am of opinion that even were the requisition complied with, your force would not be adequate to the protection of this frontier and the settlements. Having the highest respect for your opinion, knowing how conscientiously and carefully you approach any field of labor, and how thoroughly you investigate it, and reach your conclusions, I am constrained to express my judgment that you would soon be obliged to call for an additional force, fully equal in all to the force which has been called out by my previous proclamation.

In such a case I have no alternative than to act according to my own deliberate judgment, for if, waiving my own judgment to yours, injury should result, the responsibility would attach to me not less than to yourself.

Otherwise why is the militia organized and the executive made its commander-in-chief? It is to meet emergencies like the present.

But were it practicable to comply with your requisitions, and were those requisitions for a force, in my judgment, competent, I should not deem it expedient to place the force thus raised under the command of the officers of the regular service.

The war has now gone on five months. It is a war emphatically for the defence of the settlements, so much so that I have ordered to the Sound four companies from the Columbia river, and at this critical period it is important that there should be no changes in the command or in the plan.

In view of this, and also in view of the changes of opinion and of plan on the part of the officer in chief command on this coast, growing out of a want of understanding of the difficulties to be encountered, I am of opinion that the whole force will be more efficient, and that there will be a better spirit of co-operation, if the regular and volunteer services are kept distinct.

Be this as it may, the campaign is, I trust, approaching its consummation, and changes of plan can only be fraught with mischief.

The citizens of this Territory have very great confidence in the officers of the regular service, and especially is this the case with the

people of the Sound. Their relations have been more than cordial. They are the witnesses of the efficiency of the troops stationed here, and their gratitude has been announced on several occasions since the organization of the Territory.

The force now in the field has not been mustered into the service of the Territory, but into the service of the United States. My authority, as the highest federal officer of the Territory, is derived from the same source as that of the Major General commanding the Pacific division. I am commissioned by the President, and I act under the laws of Congress and the responsibility of my oath of office.

For these reasons your requisitions cannot be complied with. At the same time you may rest assured of my doing everything in my power to co-operate with you, and I hope that through the action of us all the war may soon be closed, and the suffering inhabitants of the Territory be rescued from their present unhappy condition.

Truly and respectfully, your most obedient,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,

*Governor and Commander-in-chief.*

Lieutenant Colonel SILAS CASEY,

*Ninth Infantry, Commanding Puget Sound Division,  
Fort Steilacoom, Washington Territory.*

#### No. 6.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON,  
*Olympia, March 15, 1856.*

SIR: I have dispatched my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel Crosbie, to confer with you in relation to a combined movement of the naval and military forces from Seattle.

I have selected Colonel Crosbie for this duty in consequence of his great familiarity with all portions of the country, its geography, its Indian tribes, and its people.

If an operation could go on from Seattle, say a boat expedition to the lake, the establishment of a block house on that lake, and a good wagon road opened therefrom with Seattle, it would combine admirably with the operations now going on from this quarter, and from the Sno-ho-mish, would much circumscribe the country now occupied by the hostiles, would promise opportunities of striking immediate blows, and would probably pave the way for the final blow to end the war.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,

*Governor Territory Washington.*

Captain SAMUEL SWARTWOUT,

*Commanding Naval Forces, Puget Sound, Seattle.*

## No. 7.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MASSACHUSETTS,  
*Harbor of Seattle, Washington Territory, March 16, 1856.*

SIR: Your letter of the 15th instant was handed to me to-day by Lieutenant Colonel Crosbie.

In reply, I would state that my instructions, upon assuming the command of the United States naval forces in Puget Sound, direct me act in concert with the military forces under Major General Wool, where the same can be done within the immediate vicinity of the Sound, but not to permit any portion of my command to go into the interior. If, however, I were at liberty to co-operate with your volunteers in prosecuting the expedition you have projected, it would be impracticable, as I understand that the river from here to the lakes is not navigable for our boats, and besides, when the volunteers leave this place the inhabitants will be entirely dependent upon the naval forces here in the event of an attack by the hostile Indians.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL SWARTWOUT, *Commander,*  
*Commanding United States Naval Forces, Puget Sound.*

To his Excellency ISAAC I. STEVENS,

*Governor and Commander-in-chief W. T. Volunteer Forces.*

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*General Wool to the Commanding General.*

BENICIA, HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,  
*San Francisco, March 20, 1856.*

COLONEL: Last evening I returned from visiting the several military posts of Crescent City, Fort Orford, and Vancouver, and in Puget Sound, Fort Steilacoom. To each commandant of posts and districts I gave such instructions as appeared necessary for an active, vigilant, and successful prosecution of the war against the Indians.

From Vancouver I took with me two companies of the 9th infantry, commanded by Major Garnett, and landed them at Steilacoom on the 14th March. The same day I inspected the post and supplies. The latter were abundant and of good quality.

Lieutenant Colonel Casey appears to have conducted the operations of his command with great skill and judgment. With the additional companies under Major Garnett, he will soon bring the war to a close on Puget Sound, unless prevented by Governor Stevens' determination to carry on the war independent of the United States troops. This remark is equally applicable to the conduct of Governor Curry, of Oregon, who is still carrying on the war against the Indians east of the Cascade mountains. These two governors appear to be running a race to see who can dip the deepest into the treasury of the United States. In the dense forests of Puget Sound another Florida war can be easily carried on, and at an expense of twenty or more



millions. The same remarks will apply to the mountain region of Rogue river valley. It is only necessary to carry out the intentions of many citizens of Oregon and Washington, as practiced in several instances, to exterminate the Indians, friends as well as enemies. This can be done, but it would cost the United States from fifty to one hundred millions, all which can be avoided by a just and judicious course pursued towards the Indians. I have no doubt that in a very short time I could settle all difficulties with the Indians if the governors (Stevens and Curry) and their volunteers withdraw from the contest. Their object is war, and not peace. I have on Puget Sound seven companies of regulars, in the Rogue river valley seven companies, and one near by, at Humboldt. Brevet Major Wycer, with his company, has been ordered to Fort Lane. This force, I am confident, will be all sufficient to bring the war to a close in southern Oregon. It certainly will be sufficient if Governor Curry's volunteers will cease their practice of indiscriminately killing the Indians, friends as well as foes.

In a former communication I mentioned the conduct of Major Lupton and his party, in killing twenty-five Indians, of whom eighteen were women and children. This occurred in October. Captain Smith, commanding at Fort Lane, reports, that "on the 23d of December last, a party of volunteers, unarmed, belonging to a company then stationed on or near Butte Creek, made a visit to a camp of friendly Indians, on the north side of Rogue river, some fifteen miles from this post, and assured the Indians of the friendly disposition of the whites towards them, and their desire to live in peace. The object of this visit, on the part of the whites, was to ascertain the strength, position, &c., of this Indian camp, and finding them unarmed, with the exception of a few bows and arrows, marched there on the following night, surrounded the camp, and killed nineteen men, burned their houses and stores, and left the women and children exposed to the severe cold weather.

"The squaws and children are now at this post, suffering severely from frozen limbs. Old Jake, (chief of this same band,) with his immediate family, was encamped near Butte creek, on the south side of Rogue river. A party from another company of volunteers paid a similar visit to his camp, and for the same dastardly purpose, and at night surrounded his camp and massacred all the men. The squaws and children from this camp are also here, suffering with frozen limbs."

Herewith I enclose a copy of a letter from Captain H. M. Judah, relating to Indian affairs. It deserves attention. Certainly the Indians referred to have been greatly neglected. They ought to have been treated differently by the superintendent of Indian affairs for California.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL,

*Major General.*

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

*Assistant Adjutant General,*

*Headquarters of the army, New York.*

FORT JONES, CALIFORNIA, *March 8, 1856.*

SIR; I have the honor to make the following statement in reference to the Scott's valley Indians collected at this post.

About three weeks since, I was called upon by William Steele, esq., a prominent citizen of this valley, who exhibited to me a letter of authorization from Colonel Henly, superintendent of Indian affairs in this State, to take with him two of the most prominent of the Indians to the Nome Lackee reservation, in order that they might, if possible, become favorably impressed with its advantages as a future home for the tribe.

Mr. Steele was accompanied by a gentleman named Weeks, who is conversant with the Shasta language, and who returned a few days since with the two Indians, (John and Jack.)

Mr. Weeks informed me that both Mr. Steele and himself were very coldly and impolitely (if not rudely) treated by the residing agent, a Mr. Stevens, who informed them that Colonel Henly had gone to Washington, and that he had not been informed of their intended visit. Mr. Stevens offered no facilities for carrying out the purposes of the visit, and finally evinced his utter ignorance or intentional display of the most ordinary politeness, by leaving his office with his friends for a social purpose, expressed in the presence of Messers Steele and Weeks, who were left to carry out the purposes of their visit as they best could.

They shortly after left the office, and walked with the Indians for a couple of hours upon the reservation, returning to Tehama, without further notice from Mr. Stevens.

Enough information was gleaned during their short visit to warrant the conclusion that the Indians upon the reserve are grossly neglected, and that the government is imposed upon in the conduction of the affairs of the reservation. This information, with the exception of one item, afforded me by Mr. Weeks, was obtained by Tyé John from conversation with the Indians themselves. The item referred to is the following: "Some few days before their arrival, a man living in the vicinity of the reservation came upon the same, and deliberately killed twelve of the Indians from one rancheria for killing, or suspicion of having killed some hogs belonging to him." Mr. Weeks states that the occurrence seemed to excite little comment, and was not adverted to by Mr. Stevens. If such acts are really permitted upon that reservation, Indians had better take their chances as outlaws in the mountains.

The Indian, Tyé John, informs me that the Indian with whom he conversed assured him that they were uncomfortable, unhappy, and that their numbers were being very rapidly reduced by death; that they had no fires in the winter, were not supplied with clothing, and received neither flour nor beef, their sole food being wheat. John also informed me that both he and his tribe preferred to be killed and buried upon the soil of their fathers to being removed to Nome Lackee.

Although the officers upon the reserve would probably deny the existence of such a state of affairs as above represented, I am convinced

that it exists, and that no arrangement pertaining to Indian affairs in this State bears investigation. I am led to this belief through personal observations made during the past two years.

In view of the facts that the visit of the Indians to Nome Lackee was reduced to a farce, and that no further action in reference to the Scott's valley Indians may be expected from the Indian department in this State, I respectfully request more specific instructions in reference to them than any I am acting under. They are entirely disarmed as far as fire-arms are concerned, and cannot possibly subsist themselves with their bows and arrows. They are daily supplied with beef and flour by the acting assistant commissary of subsistence at this post, and have been since collected upon the military reserve for protection against the whites, which is still necessary. As a continual source of annoyance to the post, as well as to the people of Scott's valley, in view of the probability of a descent by hostile Indians upon some of the sparsely settled portions of the State during the summer, in which case the Scott's valley Indians would, though innocent, suffer through revenge; of their uniformly good conduct, and through considerations of humanity, they should be removed as soon as possible. I would, therefore, recommend that Lieutenant Crook, or some other officer, be permitted to take two of the most prominent of their number to the reservation upon the Lower Klamath, for purposes of inspection; and that, upon their return, I be authorized to remove them to that place.

The Indians have within the past two days assumed their bows and arrows, which they constantly wear upon their persons, undoubtedly with a view to escape in the event of a forcible attempt to remove them to the Nomo Lackee reservation.

Apologizing for the length of this communication, into which, from the interest I feel upon the subject, I have unintentionally been drawn.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. M. JUDAH,

*Captain 4th infantry, commanding.*

Captain D. R. JONES, *U. S. A.,*

*Asst. Adj. Gen., Department Pacific, Benicia, California.*

Upon a perusal of the above communication, I respectfully beg leave to withdraw the paragraph which unfavorably characterizes the administration of Indian affairs in this State, *as irrelevant.*

A true copy.

D. R. JONES,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Indian affairs. Highly interesting.

Respectfully submitted,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*New York, April 17, 1856.*

The within communication presents evils which, under the existing organization, this department has not power to remedy. The conduct of the officers of the army on this occasion is in keeping with that which they have generally observed, and is fully approved.

JEFF'N DAVIS,  
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 22, 1856.

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*General Wool to the Commanding General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,  
*Benicia, California, April 2, 1856.*

COLONEL: Having been wrongfully and unjustifiably assailed and denounced by the governors of Oregon and Washington Territories and the legislature of the former, who have demanded of the President of the United States my recall from the command of the Pacific department, I have deemed it proper to transmit, with the request that it may be forwarded to the War Department, the following summary statement of facts in regard to the Indian war now waged in those Territories, and which I could hope might claim attention.

A year since I ordered Brevet Major Haller, with about 150 rank and file, to go as far as Fort Boise to give protection to emigrants going to Oregon and Washington Territories, and to demand the murderers of some twelve or thirteen emigrants near that place the year before.

The Major not only went to Fort Boise but 150 miles beyond. He remained in that section of country until near the close of September, 1855, when he returned to his post at the Dalles, having previously captured and executed a number of the Indians concerned in the murders above alluded to.

Shortly after his return, and early in October, he was called on by Major Rains to execute a similar mission against the Yakima Indians, occupying a portion of the country east of the Cascade range of mountains. It is said that the Yakimas, having become dissatisfied with the treaty made with them the summer before, by General Stevens, determined on war.

This was hastened, as it would seem, by some miners forcibly carrying away and ill-treating some Yakima squaws. The Yakimas, according to their own story, complained of this wrong to A. J. Bolon, sub-Indian agent, who was at the time in the Yakima country, and demanded redress. An altercation took place, when the Indians threatened revenge. The agent, in turn, threatened if they executed their intentions to send against them the troops of the United States. It was under such circumstances that the agent and the Indians separated.

The former, however, was followed and overtaken by the Yakimas, when they demanded to know if he intended to send the troops of the United States against them. On answering them in the affirmative,

as the Indians say, they killed him, and afterwards, as reported, some miners, on their way to the Colville mines.

On this information being conveyed to Major Rains, Brevet Major Haller was directed to proceed against the Yakimas, to chastise them and demand the murderers of the agent Bolon.

Accordingly, with one hundred and four rank and file, he proceeded on his mission, but without the precautions necessary against savage warfare.

About sixty miles from the Dalles, on emerging from a deep ravine, he found himself, as he reports, confronted by 1,500 Indians. After losing two men killed, and some thirteen or fourteen wounded, one mortally, he escaped from his perilous condition to an eminence, on which was neither wood, water, or grass. He reported that he was surrounded by Indians, and asked for a thousand men to relieve him.

This was communicated to the Dalles by a person who succeeded in passing the Indians without being observed. Relief was immediately ordered. In the meantime, after remaining on the hill thirty-six or forty hours, water being indispensable both to men and animals, the major determined to force his way to water. He broke up his encampment and commenced his march for the stream in his front.

He met with no resistance, and after allaying the thirst of his men, horses, and mules, he commenced his march towards the Dalles.

In his effort to make good his retreat, he became separated from his rear guard, the front and rear taking different trails. The guard, supposing that it was following the front of the column, continued its march towards the Dalles without interference or molestation from the Indians. This left the major with only forty effective men, and the wounded and baggage.

With this small force he succeeded in making good his retreat, followed two days and nights by 1,500 Indians.

I think the number greatly exaggerated. However this may be, under the circumstances, I did not consider such an enemy greatly to be dreaded. The repulse of Major Haller created great excitement and alarm throughout Oregon and Washington, lest all the Indian tribes in the Territories should at once combine and come down upon the settlements. As soon as I was informed of Major Haller's defeat, I ordered all the disposable troops at my command to the seat of war, and I followed. At the same time I called upon the United States government for at least an additional regiment. This was promptly responded to, and the 9th regiment of infantry arrived early in January, but, owing to the unusually severe winter, could not enter upon a winter campaign. In the meantime, Major Rains, who had authority for such purposes, made preparation for a second expedition against the Yakimas.

He mustered, with the reinforcements which I sent him, five hundred regulars, with three mountain howitzers, besides other artillery—an ample force, if properly directed, to have defeated all the Indians in the country. The Major, however, partaking somewhat of the alarm pervading the country, increased and stimulated by political demagogues, called on Acting Governor Mason for two companies of volunteers, which was promptly and favorably responded to; and upon

Governor Curry, of Oregon, for four companies, which he refused, because, as he said, the Oregonians would not serve under United States officers. At the same time he called into the territorial service two mounted regiments, one to serve against the Indians in Washington Territory, and the other to serve against the Indians in southern Oregon. Of the former, no part of it, in any sense of the term, was necessary to defend the inhabitants of Oregon against the Indians in Washington Territory, east of the Cascade mountains, from whom they had no danger whatever to apprehend. Major Rains having completed his preparations, with 350 regulars and three mountain howitzers, set out about the 1st of November for the Yakima country, followed by six companies of Governor Curry's troops, commanded by Colonel Nesmith, no doubt a very capable and enterprising officer, and about seventy miles from the Dalles met the Yakimas, who, after several skirmishes, without any loss on either side, excepting one Indian killed and scalped by an Indian who accompanied the troops of Major Rains, fled over the mountains to the Yakima river, about forty miles distant. But in consequence of the snow, then fast falling, being several feet deep on the intervening mountains, the Major could not follow—at least, he so reported. He therefore commenced his return, having lost fifty-four animals captured by the Indians, but not until the volunteers, unfortunately, had destroyed the Atahnum mission, an important position, and one which ought to have been occupied by the Major. On his return he crossed mountains which he had previously passed, which were covered with snow from two to five feet deep. His command was ordered to the Dalles, and he reported to me in person on the 24th of November.

I arrived on the 17th, having been detained on the passage from San Francisco eleven days, owing to gales and a fire, which crippled the steamer on board of which I was a passenger, by which she came very near being lost.

Anxious to establish a post at Walla-Walla, in order to prevent what followed, a war against the Walla-Wallas by the troops of Governor Curry, I ordered a critical inspection of all the troops and animals, when it was discovered that many of the soldiers were without shoes and proper clothing for the season, and that all the animals, with very few exceptions, owing to constant service during the summer and fall, and especially in the last two expeditions of Majors Rains and Haller, were rendered unfit for service. I had determined, however, if it was possible, to take possession of the Walla-Walla country before winter had fairly commenced. Not because I considered it in any respect necessary for the defense or protection of the inhabitants of Oregon or Washington Territory.

The Indians in that region, two hundred miles distant, could not pass the Cascade range of mountains, then covered with several feet of snow.

The only route by which they could reach the settlements of Oregon was by the Dalles, where we had a sufficient regular force to repel all the Indians in Washington Territory.

My object was simply to overawe these tribes, and to prevent them from uniting with the Yakimas—the authors of the war. They had

not yet taken part in the war; at least they had not then killed a white man. To accomplish my purpose no time was to be lost. Accordingly, I directed Major Cross, chief quartermaster in my staff, to procure, if practicable, the means of transportation. This could not be obtained in Oregon or Washington without great delay and at an enormous expense, which the state of the war did not call for, owing to the resources of the country being very much exhausted by the large requisitions of General Curry to fit out his several expeditions.

This compelled me to seek elsewhere for means of transportation.

Hence, I directed Major Cross to have wagons, horses, and mules sent from Benicia, and boats and forage from San Francisco, to Vancouver.

Before the animals, &c., arrived the river Columbia froze over. This cut off all communication with the Dalles and the Indian country east of the Cascade mountains. For three weeks I was ice-bound, not being able to communicate with the Dalles or San Francisco.

Governor Curry, however, had brought two regiments of mounted men in the field, at an enormous expense. Nothing had yet been accomplished by them, and certainly not by the regiment intended to operate against the Indians in Washington Territory.

Something had to be done. A fight with the Indians, no matter whether friends or enemies, was indispensable to excite the sympathy of the nation, and especially Congress, or the propriety of paying contributions, so profusely levied on the people of Oregon, might be questioned. Accordingly, Colonel Nesmith was ordered by Governor Curry with his command to march against the Walla-Wallas, where Major Chinn, with five companies, had been previously ordered.

On an inspection of the horses of the colonel's command, although but twenty days in the field, they were pronounced unfit for that service. Several companies, however, were prepared, and, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, a member of the legislature of Oregon, joined Major Chinn, who, instead of going to Fort Walla-Walla, where he was ordered by Governor Curry, took post on the Umatilla, thirty miles distant, because, as he reported, there were one thousand Indians in and about the fort.

Although in this position for several weeks, and frequently sending scouts within a mile or two of the Indians, he was neither molested nor interfered with. Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, on joining Major Chinn, moved against Fort Walla-Walla, but found no Indians there. He then moved up the river Touchét, where he was met by the chief "Piu-piu-mox-mox," with a flag of truce. He said he was for peace; that he did not wish to fight; that his people did not wish to fight, and that if any of his young men had done wrong he was prepared to make restitution. If he could not return the goods wrongfully taken, he would pay for them, being abundantly able to do so. When the volunteers said they were in want of provisions he offered them cattle. He was rich in money, horses, and cattle.

The volunteers replied he had better go back and fight. He refused, and with his companions, four (Lieutenant Colonel Kelly says six) in number, was taken prisoner, and sent guarded to the volunteer camp. The volunteers then commenced the attack upon his people, which was



continued for four days, without any great loss on either side, when the Walla-Wallas, having secured their women and children, crossed Snake river. The second or third day of the engagement, the volunteers barbarously killed "Piu-piu-mox-mox" and his companions. They took from the chief's head some twenty scalps, cut off his ears and hands, and sent them as trophies to their friends in Oregon.

As the volunteers, having no boats, could not cross Snake river, the retreat of the Indians closed their winter campaign, except to plunder the friendly Cayuses of their horses and cattle.—(See my letter dated the 12th February, 1856, to Governor I. I. Stevens.)

Owing to the severity of the winter, except those captured by the Indians, most of the volunteers' horses died from fatigue and the want of forage or grass. Major Chinn said that about two hundred and twenty-five of their best horses were captured by the Indians.

It is reported that Governor Curry has in part replaced them with a fresh relay.

In February thirteen wagons loaded with supplies, including ammunition, for the volunteers, guarded by only four men, were captured by the Indians, between the Umatilla and Fort Walla-Walla.

Such have been the results of one of the most unwise, unnecessary, and extravagant expeditions ever fitted out in the United States, and for no other reason than to plunder the treasury of the United States, and to make political capital for somebody.

It could not have been projected for the defence of the inhabitants of Oregon, nor for the protection of Oregonians in Washington Territory, for none resided there. What then could have been the object? Nothing but a crusade against the Indians, and a long war to enrich the country.

If such was not the object, Governor Curry, instead of sending his troops against the Indians in Washington Territory, and beyond his jurisdiction, would have sent all of them to southern Oregon, where the war raged, and nowhere else in his Territory. The Oregonians say that the war "is a God-send to the country."

It would appear, however, from the governor's proclamation, that he did send a regiment to southern Oregon; but from all the information I have received from that section of country, they have been of little or no service, so far as giving protection to the inhabitants is concerned, and yet the war has been carried on between the volunteers and the Indians in a most singularly barbarous and savage manner. My information is derived from citizens and regular officers under my command, and not from any of the civil or military functionaries of the Territory of Oregon.

I have never been informed by any one, not even by the governor, of the military wants of the Territory. He has never called on me for troops to defend it, or to protect the inhabitants from savage barbarity. Although he has, as it would appear, purposely avoided all communication with me on the subject, I have not been unmindful of the condition and wants of the Territory. I have not failed, as far as it was in my power, to defend and protect such parts as were exposed and assailed by the Indians, and I have no doubt but for the indiscriminate warfare carried on against them, and the massacre of several

parties of friendly Indians by the troops of Governor Curry, the war would have long since been brought to a close in Oregon.

Although the Indians are retaliating with fearful vengeance on innocent citizens, for the murder in October last, by Major Lupton and his party, of 25 friendly Indians, 18 of whom were women and children, all going to the military reservation at Fort Lane, for protection, and notwithstanding the massacres on 23d and 24th December last, when volunteers murdered about forty unarmed friendly Indians, belonging to the band of the chief, Jake, who was among the killed, I think if the volunteers, who expect to be paid largely for their services, were withdrawn, and private war prevented, I could soon end the war in Rogue river valley, and, indeed, throughout Oregon and Washington.

But the determination of the Oregonians to exterminate the Indians, which I am wholly opposed to, if not discountenanced by the United States government, may prolong the war almost indefinitely.

Another Florida war can be had in Rogue River valley, owing to the mountainous character of the country. The same remark will apply to Puget Sound, where it is exceedingly difficult to follow the Indians in the dense forests of that region. Yet, by a proper and judicious course, the war may be brought to a close; when, by establishing posts at proper points, a recurrence of the past might be prevented. But to do this, I repeat, the extermination of the Indians should be abandoned. No doubt they could be exterminated, but it would cost from fifty to one hundred millions, besides thousands of innocent and valuable lives.

Still, with all the difficulties presented and staring us in the face, I do not despair. With eight companies of regular troops in Rogue River valley and another on the way, with not to exceed two hundred warriors in arms, increased to that number by the barbarous conduct of the volunteers towards the friendly Indians, and seven companies in Puget Sound, where there are not one hundred and fifty in arms against the whites, commanded by active, vigilant, and intelligent officers, I cannot but hope that the war in those two sections will soon be brought to a close, when we will meet with no difficulty in bringing the Indians to terms, east of the Cascade range of mountains.

To show how determined the people of Oregon are to exterminate the Indians, it is only necessary to represent their conduct towards four hundred friendly Indians waiting, on the military reserve at Fort Lane, to be conducted to the coast range reservation. Captain Smith, commanding at that post, with two companies of regulars, reported to me that it took a large part of his command to prevent the citizens from murdering those four hundred Indians.

I have been informed, by those whose character for truth and veracity is not to be questioned, that meetings of the citizens of Oregon had been held, when it was resolved, if the attempt was made to conduct those Indians to the coast reserve, they would not only kill them, but all who might accompany them.

After the Indians recently started for the reserve, although escorted by one hundred soldiers, they were followed by a citizen who shot one of the Indians, declaring, at the same time, he intended to follow

them and kill all he could. I regret that I am compelled to say that such conduct is too much encouraged by persons holding high offices under the government of the United States. And because I have opposed this inhuman and barbarous practice, and the wholesale plundering of the treasury of the United States, which there is no circumstance to justify, I have been denounced by the governors of both Territories and the legislature of Oregon.

The latter has demanded of the President of the United States my removal from the command of the Pacific department. To discover how much truth is contained in the charges presented against me in the memorial to the President, it will only be necessary to read this communication.

I am, however, surprised to find that the legislature does not know the boundaries of its own Territory. Walla-Walla is in Washington and not in Oregon Territory. No citizens were there, except two or three, besides those who were, or had been, attached to the Hudson's Bay Company, and these were mostly half-breeds and Canadians.

It is well known that they are in no danger of being killed by the Indians. All not Americans, or "Bostons," as the Indians call them, not found in arms against them are respected, at least they are in no danger of being killed by them.

In conclusion, it only remains for me to notice a letter, lest it should create false impressions and mislead the public, of I. I. Stevens, governor of Washington Territory, dated the 8th of March, 1856, and published in San Francisco.

The governor in his letter of appeal to the citizens of San Francisco, would induce them to believe that there were not to exceed 900 regulars in Washington and Oregon, and that there were but four companies of regulars at one point in Puget Sound.

At the date of his letter there were five companies of regulars actively operating against less than two hundred warriors in arms against the whites, and six days after, seven companies, 500 strong, under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Casey and Major Garnett. At the date of his letter, instead of 900, as he asserts, there were 1,900 regulars, and at this time 2,000. Of the 33 companies in the Pacific department, 27 are operating in Oregon and Washington, distributed as follows, viz: nine in southern Oregon, 700 strong, actively operating against, certainly not to exceed, 200 warriors in arms against the whites; seven companies, as before mentioned, in Puget Sound, with less than 200 warriors in arms against them; one company at Vancouver, and ten companies at the Dalles, under command of Colonel George Wright, of the 9th infantry. The latter will be efficiently, and I trust successfully, employed against the Indians east of the Cascade range of mountains as soon as the season will permit, that is, as soon as grass can be had to support animals.

A force amply sufficient to terminate the war in all parts of the two Territories, and afterwards to prevent past occurrences, if the volunteers could be withdrawn and private war prevented. But as long as governors of Territories make war, and exercise powers, as I believe, unknown to the President of the United States, and individuals raise volunteers and make war on the Indians whenever they please, and

Congress will pay the expense, so long will we have war in Oregon and Washington Territories.

It is said by intelligent men that the expense of Governor Curry's army will amount, in scrip, from two to four millions. If Congress should foot the bill, some governor of another Territory will make a bill of ten millions.

I do not know how the question will be considered. One thing, however, is certain, that it is an example which, if countenanced by the United States government, may, when least expected, lead to no less embarrassing than disastrous results.

Herewith I forward copies of instructions, marked 1, 2, and 3, to Colonel George Wright and Lieutenant Colonel Silas Casey, in regard to the employment of volunteers, and the course they should pursue in conducting the war against the Indians, and the protection of the inhabitants of Oregon and Washington Territories.

I also send copies, marked 4 and 5, of a correspondence between Lieutenant Colonel Casey and Governor Stevens, on the subject of calling into service two companies of volunteers.

Governor Stevens, like Governor Curry, refuses to place volunteers under the command of United States officers. Colonel Wright, March 1, on this subject, says that "from the best information I can obtain, the presence of the volunteers in the Walla-Walla country during the last two months has been highly injurious, and tended to increase the number of our enemies."

Similar reports are made from most of the regular officers, of the volunteers acting under their observation.

I also send a copy of a report of Lieutenant Colonel George Nauman, marked 6, who was ordered to southern California to examine into the condition of affairs in that region, and to ascertain the feelings and disposition of the Indians on the Colorado.

His report is highly favorable to peace.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Major General.*

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

*Assist. Adjutant General, New York.*

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Indian affairs. Highly interesting. I have full confidence in General Wool's statement of facts, and fully concur in his views and sentiments.

Respectfully submitted,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

HEADQUARTERS, *New York, May 2, 1856.*

## No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,  
*Benicia, California, January 29, 1856.*

COLONEL: No doubt ere this you have received special orders No. 6, and a letter of instruction, dated the 19th instant, assigning you to the command of the troops in Washington Territory and northern Oregon, which includes Puget Sound, Vancouver, and the Dalles, and all the country north and east of the Cascade mountains.

You will exercise supervising control over all, and direct such operations as you may deem proper.

As soon as the season will permit, preparatory to operations in the Indian country east and north of the Cascade mountains, you will establish the headquarters of your regiment at the Dalles, where all the troops intended for the Indian country will be concentrated. Previous to which every attention will be given to perfecting them in the rifle or light infantry drill, as also in the duties of guards. The latter is an important duty, and should receive every attention. I found but few of the younger officers of the 4th infantry acquainted with that duty. Your own headquarters you can establish either at Vancouver or the Dalles. You will, of course, be most of your time at the latter place during the period of preparation for the field.

The points which I intended as the base of operations are the Selah fisheries, on the Yakima river, and some point on or near the Columbia river in the neighborhood of Fort Walla-Walla. It is my intention to establish a permanent post somewhere in this region at the most eligible point for controlling the surrounding Indian tribes, and to command the river and its crossings. On account of the scarcity of timber, it may be necessary to go some distance up the Touchét river before a suitable position for the establishment of a post can be found. Between the Dalles and the Selah fisheries an intermediate post, with one company, may be necessary, to prevent the Yakimas from taking fish in the streams which empty themselves in the Yakima and Columbia rivers. This intermediate post should be given to some active and energetic officer.

Herewith you will receive a memoir and sketches, by Captain Cram, chief of the topographical engineers, of the country in which your command will be required to operate. I would recommend it to your attentive perusal. From this you will perceive that the Selah fisheries are one hundred miles from the Dalles, and from the latter to the Atahmun river mission it is seventy miles, which position may be important as an intermediate post between the Dalles and the Selah fisheries. From the Dalles to Fort Walla-Walla it is one hundred and forty-two miles, and from the latter place to Selah fisheries ninety-five miles by the road to Steilacoom.

With boats to cross the Columbia river, your forces at either point could be in four days concentrated; by forced marches, in three days or less. For crossing the Columbia river I ordered four portable boats, and a flat to be prepared in pieces, to be put together on the arrival of the troops at or near Walla-Walla.

Expeditions should be prepared to leave at the earliest moment, that is, as soon as grass can be obtained for animals, for Fort Walla-Walla, and the Selah fisheries. It is not probable, however, that you will be able, on account of snow on the intervening mountains, to go to the Selah fisheries as soon, by three or four weeks, as to the Walla-Walla country. Hence, as soon as the season will permit, you will conduct yourself a force of four or five companies, with three mountain howitzers and one six-pounder, to Walla-Walla.

It is desirable that you conduct this expedition with reference to the selection of a proper position for a post, and to ascertain the feelings and dispositions of the several tribes in that section of the country. I do not believe that the Walla-Wallas, the Cayuses, Pelouses, and Umatillas, had resolved on war until the attack of the volunteers on the Walla-Wallas.

The murder of the chief, Piu-pin-mox-mox, whilst a prisoner, by the volunteers, has united those tribes against us. I do not believe, however, that they will continue the war a great while. The occupation of the country between the Walla-Walla, Touché, and Snake rivers, and the opposite side of the Columbia, will very soon bring those tribes to terms.

The occupation at the proper time of the Yakima country from the Atahmun mission, and the country on the Yakima river, extending above and below the Selah fisheries, will compel the Yakimas, I think, to sue for peace or abandon their country. Supplies for the Selah fisheries must be packed, unless they should be sent by the way of Walla-Walla and the Steilacoom road.

It is desirable that at least sixty days' provisions should be sent with either expedition, to Walla-Walla or the Selah fisheries.

After the return of Major Rains, I ordered an inspection of all the animals, some 450, when very few were found to be fit for service. Since then, Major Cross, chief quartermaster, has sent about 225 horses and mules to Vancouver.

It is very desirable that all the animals, including the dragoon horses, should be well taken care of, in order that they may be fit for service as soon as the troops can take the field. I have again and again given orders and instructions on that subject, and especially that the dragoon horses should have the best of care, and be put under cover.

I ordered, I think, as early as August last, stables to be put up at the Dalles, for the company of dragoons at Vancouver. I understand they were nearly completed when I left, the 12th January. When this company goes to the Dalles, you will direct Major Fitzgerald to put his horses in the building designed as a stable for him. If the quartermaster occupies any part of it for quartermaster's stores they will be moved out. The horses of that company must be put in a condition for active services by the time you will be ready to move.

In conclusion, I would remark, that we have no authority to call for volunteers, to employ them, or to furnish them with supplies. Therefore the less you have to do with them, unless in extreme cases, which I do not anticipate, the better it will be for the service. Many

of them, as well as most of the Oregonians, are for exterminating the Indians, and accordingly do not discriminate between friends and foes.

The course thus far pursued by Governor Curry and the volunteers has only tended to increase our Indian enemies, whilst it has subjected the regular service to great inconvenience and expense. This, too, by exhausting the resources of Oregon and Washington, and without accomplishing the least good.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL,  
*Major General.*

Colonel GEORGE WRIGHT,  
*Commanding at Vancouver.*

P. S. Applications are frequently made for clerks in the commissary and quartermaster's departments. I have issued an order prohibiting any clerks being appointed in the disbursing departments, except by special instructions from the War Department, without my sanction and approval. If clerks are required by any disbursing officer under your command, the application should be made through you, with your approval or otherwise.

By the memoir of Captain Cram, you will perceive that obstacles on the routes to the Selah fisheries and to Walla-Walla will require your attention. On fitting out expeditions, pioneer parties should be organized, to go in advance and to remove, as far as practicable, all obstacles that would retard your progress.

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No. 2.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,  
*Benicia, February 22, 1856.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, last evening, of your communication of the 4th instant.

In reply the general commanding directs me to say that you will receive by the steamer Massachusetts, Captain Swartout commanding, his instructions and views in regard to the course you should pursue in prosecuting the war against the Indians. With five companies of regular troops, not less than three hundred and fifty strong, with several ships-of-war, including the steamer Massachusetts, he had great hopes that you would be able to bring the war to a close without the aid of volunteers. On this subject, however, the commanding general directs me to say that volunteers cannot be recognized or employed unless received and mustered into the service of the United States. Therefore, if volunteers should be considered indispensably necessary at any time to aid in defending the inhabitants of Puget Sound and in that vicinity, or to bring the war to a close, you will call on the governor of the Territory for the number you might require, not to be mounted, and when forwarded to you have them examined and regularly mustered into the service.



This course will be adopted only in case of absolute necessity, as the general has no authority to call volunteers into the service, and he will not sanction or tolerate it, unless absolutely necessary for the protection of the inhabitants of the Territory. He will send you, as soon as practicable, one or two companies of the fourth or ninth infantry. From necessity they will be compelled to go by land. At the present time, it is said to be impracticable on account of high water, the streams not being fordable.

Your requisition for quartermasters' stores will be complied with.

Neither horses nor mules can be sent from here. They must be obtained by purchase in either Washington or Oregon Territory. Your requisition for ordnance and ordnance stores was anticipated and the articles sent by the Massachusetts, except the expanding rifle cartridges. Twenty thousand have been ordered. Five thousand rifle cartridges were sent by the Massachusetts.

In conclusion, the general directs me to say that whilst he approves of your efforts to induce the Indians to come in and give up their arms, under promise of protection, he does not doubt that you will by your energy and activity, as well as by that of all your officers, bring the war to a close without the employment or aid of volunteers.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. R. JONES,

*Acting Adjutant General.*

Lieutenant Colonel S. CASEY,

*Ninth Infantry, commanding Fort Steilacoom,  
Washington Territory.*

True copy.

RICHARD ARNOLD,

*First Lieutenant Third Artillery and Aid-de-Camp.*

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No. 3.

BENICIA, HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,  
*On board of the Steamer Columbia, March 14, 1856.*

COLONEL: I have just arrived and landed at Steilacoom with two companies of the 9th infantry, commanded by Major Garnett. By the enclosed order you will perceive that I have directed the Major to have his command prepared for immediate and active operations.

Your communication of the 9th instant was received on my way down the Columbia river. In regard to your co-operating with volunteers ordered out by Governor Stevens, I will simply remark that no co-operation should take place on your part, unless you received them into the service of the United States, subject to your orders. If your position required volunteers to aid you in the protection of the inhabitants of the Territory, you should have called for them, and when received, to have had them mustered into the service of the United States. Any other course is decidedly wrong.

I know of no authority which authorizes governors of Territories to

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raise troops and direct their operations, independent of the officers of the United States, and certainly not independent of myself. I have been kept wholly ignorant of the state of the country, except through the regular officers of the army, and from their communications I have yet to learn that any essential service has been rendered to the country by volunteers.

I, however, approve of your course as hitherto pursued, with the above exception, and I cannot doubt but that, with the two companies under Major Garnett, you will very soon bring the war to a close.

I will be here until to-morrow, when I will leave in the steamer *Active* for San Francisco, I hope, in the meantime, to see you. It is important that I should see you before I leave.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL,  
*Major General.*

Lieutenant Colonel S. CASEY,  
*Ninth Regiment Infantry, Commanding at Steilacoom,  
Washington Territory.*

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No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS PUGET SOUND DISTRICT,  
*Fort Steilacoom, Washington Territory, March 15, 1856.*

SIR: I respectfully request that you will at once issue your proclamation calling into the service of the United States two companies of volunteers, to serve on foot, for the period of four months, unless sooner discharged.

Each company to consist of one captain, one first and one second lieutenant, four sergeants, four corporals, and seventy privates.

I wish both companies to be mustered into service at Fort Steilacoom.

The authority for calling for the above named troops has been given by the general commanding the department of the Pacific.

I received, yesterday, an accession of two companies of the ninth infantry. With this accession of force, and the two companies of volunteers called for, I am of the opinion that I shall have a sufficient number of troops to protect this frontier, without the aid of those now in the service of the Territory.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,  
*Lieutenant Colonel ninth Infantry,  
Commanding Puget Sound District.*

His Excellency I. I. STEVENS,  
*Governor of Washington Territory, Olympia, W. T.*

No. 5.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, WASHINGTON TERRITORY,  
*Olympia, March 16, 1856.*

SIR: Your letter, calling upon me for two companies of volunteers to be mustered into the regular service, has been received, and, in anticipation of my full reply, I will state that the requisition will not be complied with. I do not consider it expedient to change the plan of the campaign, nor the organization of the troops, so far as the volunteers are concerned.

Truly and respectfully, your most obedient,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,  
*Governor Territory of Washington.*

Lieutenant Colonel SILAS CASEY,  
*Commanding Puget Sound District.*

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No. 6.

FORT YUMA, CALIFORNIA, *February 27, 1856.*

SIR: I have the honor to state, that since my last report, dated the 12th instant, nothing whatever has occurred between the Indians and whites to disturb the tranquility of this portion of California, and that the former at present manifest towards us and each other the most amicable dispositions. I entertain no apprehension whatever that this desirable condition of things is likely soon to be changed. In all directions are seen unusually vigorous and extensive preparations of the soil of the river bottom for cultivation, and there can be no better guarantee of the sincerity of the friendly protestations of the natives than this manifestation of a disposition to provide for themselves so immediately in our vicinity.

The Indian whom I mentioned in my letter of the 28th ultimo as having been dispatched on the previous day to endeavor to ransom a white woman from the Mohaves, and bring her to the fort, I am extremely happy to say, returned on the 22d instant, having entirely succeeded in his mission. The young woman proves to be a Miss Oatman, whose parents were murdered by the Indians somewhere on the Gila, about eighty miles from this place, in, I think, 1850. Herself and a sister were captured on that occasion, and reduced to slavery. The latter is represented to have died about six months ago. Miss Oatman seems to be about sixteen years of age, and has, unfortunately, almost entirely lost the use of the English language, speaking nothing but that of the rude people among whom she so long resided, and which no one here can interpret well. She, however, retains a recollection of her name, and says it is Olive Oatman.

It is believed she has a brother residing at Los Angeles; the necessary measures have been taken to ascertain that fact, and if it should

turn out to be so, to apprise him of the agreeable intelligence of the recovery of his sister.

Meanwhile, every proper care is being taken of her, and it will afford us all infinite satisfaction to restore her to her friends and civilization.

It gives me much pleasure to add that the commandant of Fort Yuma, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Burke, has manifested the most commendable zeal and interest in accomplishing the very desirable object I have just detailed.

As my services, in my opinion, are no longer required at Fort Yuma, I shall, in accordance with instructions, Headquarters Department of the Pacific, February 12, 1856, set out to-morrow for my post at Benicia barracks.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

GEORGE NAUMAN,

*Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Major 3d Artillery.*

To Captain D. R. JONES,

*Assistant Adjutant General Department of the Pacific,  
Benicia, California.*